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The Dynamic Free Rider Problem: A Laboratory Study†
By Marco Battaglini, Salvatore Nunnari, and Thomas R. Palfrey*
We report the results of an experiment that investigates  free riding 
in the accumulation of durable public goods. We consider econo-
mies with reversibility, where contributions can be positive or neg-
ative; and economies with irreversibility, where contributions are 
 nonnegative. Aggregate outcomes support the qualitative predictions 
of the Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE) characterized in Battaglini, 
Nunnari, and Palfrey (2014): steady state levels of public good are 
lower with reversibility than irreversibility; accumulation is ineffi-
ciently slow; and the public good is  under-provided in both regimes. 
On the other hand, public good levels are higher than MPE, and 
some evidence of history dependence is detected. (JEL C91, H41)
There is a vast literature addressing questions related to the provision of public goods in static environments. This includes hundreds of theoretical papers in 
the lineage initiated by Samuelson’s (1954) seminal paper, presaged by the classical 
treatises on public finance by Wicksell and Lindahl.1 It also includes hundreds of 
experimental papers based on one variation or another of Samuelson’s theoretical 
model (Ledyard 1995). The typical motivating examples are national defense, pub-
lic health, transportation infrastructure, pollution abatement, and so forth. What is 
striking is that essentially all economically important examples are public goods 
that take years to accumulate, provide streams of benefits over the long term, and 
require ongoing expenditures in order to improve or even maintain their levels. 
In other words, most public goods one can think of are durable goods and hence 
dynamics are an important component of their provision. In spite of this, remark-
ably little research has addressed the durable public goods problem from a dynamic 
perspective, especially in the experimental literature.
We are mainly interested in three questions: How serious is free riding in the pro-
vision of durable public goods? What new issues emerge from the dynamic nature 
1 An excellent account of the development of the theory of public goods is Silvestre (2003). 
* Battaglini: Department of Economics, Cornell University, Uris Hall, Ithaca, NY 14850 (e-mail: battaglini@
cornell.edu); Nunnari: Department of Economics, Bocconi University, Via Roentgen 1, 20136 Milano, Italy, and 
Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research (IGIER) (e-mail: salvatore.nunnari@unibocconi.it); Palfrey: 
Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, MC 228-77, Pasadena, CA 
91125 (trp@hss.caltech.edu). We are grateful for comments from a number of seminar audiences at universities 
and conferences. We thank Lydia Mechtenberg and Steven Matthews for valuable comments. Battaglini gratefully 
acknowledges financial support from NSF (SES-0418150) and the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. Palfrey gratefully 
acknowledges financial support of grants from the National Science Foundation (SES-0962802, SES-1426560), the 
Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation (SES-1158), and the Russell Sage Foundation. Dustin Beckett and Anselm 
Rink provided valuable research assistance.
† Go to http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20150126 to visit the article page for additional materials and author 
disclosure statement(s) or to comment in the online discussion forum.
VOL. 8 NO. 4 269BATTAGLINI ET AL.: DYNAMIC FREE RIDING EXPERIMENT
of the investment process? How do the answers to these questions depend on the 
degree to which investment decisions are reversible over time?
Dynamic  free rider problems differ from static in subtle but important ways. In 
dynamic environments, we not only have the familiar free rider problem present in 
static public good provision, but also present is a second dynamic free rider phe-
nomenon that further erodes incentives for efficient provision. In these games, strat-
egies depend on the accumulated level of the public good, the state variable of the 
game: an increase in current investment by one agent typically triggers a reduction 
in future investment by all agents, in what is essentially a dynamic  crowding-out 
effect. Such dynamic crowding out is especially severe if agents coordinate on sta-
tionary equilibria where strategies depend only on the accumulated level of the pub-
lic good. On the other hand, the infinite horizon of the game generates a plethora of 
 nonstationary equilibria that provide strategic opportunities to endogenously sup-
port cooperative outcomes using  carrot-and-stick strategies. In principle, this could 
completely overcome both the static and the dynamic free rider problems. Thus, it is 
an open empirical question whether or not the free rider problem is exacerbated or 
ameliorated in the case of dynamic provision of durable public goods, as compared 
to  one-shot public goods problems.
Dynamic  free rider problems, moreover, offer a number of economically import-
ant predictions that cannot be assessed (or even stated) with static frameworks 
because they depend on the durability of the public good. First, regarding the 
storage technology, a public good is reversible if players can either increase it or 
decrease it transforming it back to private consumption; a public good is irrevers-
ible, if players cannot decrease it. Most investments are partially reversible, and the 
degree (or cost) of reversibility varies widely.2 What is the effect of irreversibility 
on contributions? Second, regarding the accumulation process, how are investment 
strategies going to depend on the state variable? If players use the state as a refer-
ence point, then the steady state may depend on the investments in the first periods: 
a good start with  overinvestment (compared to the equilibrium level) may induce 
a permanent increase in the steady state. If agents instead are anchored to a given 
equilibrium steady state target, then players should be expected to correct “anom-
alous” contributions:  overinvestment in the early periods should be corrected with 
underinvestment later on.
In this work, we make a first attempt to answer the questions raised above by 
studying the theoretical predictions of a simple dynamic public good game in a lab-
oratory experiment. The economy we study has  n individuals. In each period, each 
individual is endowed with  w units of input that can be allocated between personal 
consumption and contribution to the stock of durable public good. Utility is linear 
in consumption of the private good and concave in the accumulated stock of the 
2 For example, the art collection at the Louvre, which took centuries to accumulate, could be sold off to pri-
vate collectors and the proceeds distributed as transfer payments to the citizens of France. Cobblestone roads 
have been dug up and the stones used to build private dwellings. Military vehicles and aircraft can be (and have 
been) privatized and converted to civilian use. Publicly owned open space, even with conservation easements, are 
routinely converted to the private development of shopping malls, ski resorts, or new residential communities. 
Decades of sustainable management of fisheries, forests, or other  replenishable resources can be rapidly reversed 
by  over-harvesting or poaching. 
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durable public good. Total payoffs for a player in the game are the discounted sum 
of utility over an infinite horizon of the game, where the discount factor is  δ . We 
characterize the efficient accumulation path as a function of  w ,  n , and  δ .3 We study 
the Markov perfect equilibria of the game under two different assumptions about 
reversibility: full reversibility and irreversibility. We prove that investment is always 
higher in the irreversible case. We analyze the best subgame perfect equilibrium (a 
solution concept often used in applied work) of the two models and prove that the 
optimal investment strategies can be supported as an equilibrium with reversible 
investment but not with irreversible investment. The comparative static predictions 
implied by the two equilibrium concepts are completely opposed with respect to the 
effect of reversibility on investment: the Markov equilibrium predicts higher invest-
ments in a irreversible economy, the most efficient subgame perfect equilibrium 
predicts the opposite. These contrasting theoretical predictions are the basis for the 
main treatment in our experiment: reversibility versus irreversibility. We also have 
a secondary treatment dimension, which is the number of individuals in the game: 
we compare  n = 3 and  n = 5 . Thus, the experiment has four different treatments 
depending on  n and whether investments are reversible.
The main comparative static prediction of the model is that in a Markov equi-
librium there should be greater contributions and a higher equilibrium steady state 
level of public good in the irreversible investment economy (IIE) than in the revers-
ible investment economy (RIE). The model also predicts small differences in public 
good levels as a function of  n , with smaller groups accumulating slightly higher lev-
els of public good (in the steady state for RIE; only on the convergence path for IIE). 
The data are consistent with the main predicted treatment effects: both in RIE and 
IIE the accumulation path is inefficiently slow and the public good  under-provided; 
IIE induces significantly higher public good contributions than RIE. We do, how-
ever, observe some differences between the theoretical predictions and the data. In 
equilibrium, convergence should be monotonic. That is, the stock of public good 
should gradually increase over time until the steady state is reached, after which 
investment is zero. Instead, there is a tendency for initial  overinvestment in the early 
periods, compared to the equilibrium investment levels. In the treatment with revers-
ibility, this is followed by a significant reversal, i.e., negative investment, with the 
stock of public good gradually declining in the direction of the equilibrium steady 
state. After several periods of play, the stock of the public good is very close to the 
Markov equilibrium of the game. When disinvestment is not feasible, investment 
steadily decreases but it remains positive and the long-run level of the public good 
is significantly above the equilibrium steady state. Moreover, at least in a subset of 
periods, we observe a small but significant difference between groups of different 
sizes, with larger groups accumulating larger stocks.
In addition to the experiments described above, we propose a new methodology 
to test for Markovian behavior in equilibrium. The idea of the new experimental 
test consists in designing a  one-period experiment where subjects’ payoffs from 
3 To keep the experimental design simple, there is no depreciation, so at time  t the stock of the public good is 
simply the sum of individual investments across all periods up to time  t . Battaglini, Nunnari, and Palfrey (2014) also 
characterize the efficient path and the equilibrium accumulation paths for arbitrary depreciation rates,  d ∈ [0, 1] . 
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the  public good are given by the equilibrium value function of the unique concave 
Markov perfect equilibrium of the game with reversibility.4 In this  reduced-form 
version of the game, the individual incentives to contribute to the public good are 
exactly the same as in the fully dynamic game (under the assumption that subjects 
condition their strategies only on the public good stock), but there is no possibility to 
sustain a higher public good outcome through the  nonstationary strategies that can 
arise in a repeated game. For many levels of the public good stock, we observe no 
difference in average contributions between this reduced form of the dynamic game 
and the fully dynamic game.
Our work is related to three distinct strands of research. First, naturally, is the 
experimental literature on public good provision in static environments. This liter-
ature has explored voluntary contributions under a variety of conditions. The early 
experiments focused primarily on free riding in environments where there was a 
dominant strategy for all individuals to contribute zero to the public good. Variations 
on these early dominant strategy public goods games have been conducted in the 
laboratory under many different assumptions about utility functions and technology, 
different subject pools, asymmetric endowments and preferences, different infor-
mation conditions, different public good mechanisms, variable group sizes, and so 
forth. Many of these variations are discussed at length in Ledyard’s (1995) compre-
hensive survey of the seminal work in this area.5 The dynamic environment we study 
is fundamentally different from the static environments studied in those papers. We 
have already mentioned some of these important differences and will discuss this 
issue in greater detail in Section V, in the context of the results from our experiment.
The second literature to which our work is related consists in the work on sequen-
tial mechanisms for the provision of static public goods. Although in this litera-
ture players play a dynamic game, the purpose of the game is the determination 
of a  one-shot provision of a discrete public good (Harrison and Hirschleifer 1989; 
Dorsey 1992; Duffy, Ochs, and Vesterlund 2007; Choi, Gale, and Kariv 2008; Diev 
and Hichri 2008; Noussair and Soo 2008; Choi et al. 2011).6 In the contribution 
games studied in these papers, agents have the opportunity to revise their initial 
contributions over time, and observe the cumulative level of contributions at each 
moment. Contrary to our setup, the public good does not provide any benefit until 
the game ends. Moreover, when payoffs from the public good are a continuous func-
tion of cumulative contributions, the unique equilibrium of these mechanisms is not 
different from the corresponding  one-shot games (that is, no contribution). Only 
when a certain threshold guarantees a discrete benefit, agents might achieve the 
provision of this discrete public good, through  history-dependent trigger strategies.
Third, our work is related to the emerging experimental literature on dynamic sto-
chastic games in which a state variable provides a strategic link across periods. Early 
4 Cooper and Kühn (2014) use a  two-period game where the period 2 payoffs are derived from the continuation 
value of an infinitely repeated version of the period 1 game. This preserves the strategic incentives and the multi-
plicity of equilibria of an infinitely repeated game in a finite horizon environment. Contrary to their approach, our 
 one-period game has a unique equilibrium and is meant to eliminate the possibility to sustain more cooperative 
outcomes. 
5 See Chaudhuri (2011) and Vesterlund (2016) for more recent (and more selective) surveys. 
6 There are also public goods voluntary contribution experiments with  reduced-form  one-shot payoff functions 
that are motivated by common pool resource problems. See Ostrom (1999) for a survey. 
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contributions are Noussair and Matheny (2000) and Lei and Noussair (2002) who 
experimentally study single agent dynamic optimization problems. Herr, Gardner, 
and Walker (1997) present a model of resource utilization in a finitely repeated 
environment in which players’ actions have externalities on the preferences of cur-
rent and future players. Battaglini and Palfrey (2012) test a dynamic model of pure 
redistribution (in which the state variable is the status quo distribution of resources 
and the amount of resources is constant over time). Battaglini, Nunnari, and Palfrey 
(2012) study the effect on investments of voting rules in a model of public good 
accumulation in which investment is chosen through a  noncooperative bargaining 
process. To our knowledge Battaglini, Nunnari, and Palfrey (2010) is the first paper 
to present an experimental study of a durable public good game in which players 
make voluntary contributions. The results of that working paper are now incorpo-
rated in the present paper.7 Following this paper, Vespa (2016) has provided an 
alternative test of Markovian behavior in a game of resource exploitation similar to 
Herr, Gardner, and Walker (1997).8 The results of this paper confirm our finding that 
the Markov equilibrium is a good model of behavior in the laboratory. Interestingly, 
however, Vespa observes that the feasibility of cooperation with  nonstationary strat-
egies may depend on the complexity of the action space: cooperation may be pos-
sible with two actions, but not possible already with three. This may suggest that 
the Markov equilibrium can do well in environments like ours (with a continuum of 
actions) because players find it difficult to deal with the complexity of  nonstationary 
strategies when the action space is nontrivial.
Finally, our work is more distantly related to the experimental literature on 
infinitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma games.9 This literature has focused on identi-
fying complicated  history-dependent strategies and understanding the determinants 
of cooperation. To the contrary, we study a dynamic game with an endogenously 
evolving state variable10 and we focus on a different set of questions, namely, the 
comparison of outcomes under different storing technologies.
From a theoretical point of view, our work draws on Battaglini, Nunnari, and 
Palfrey (2014) who first characterized the equilibrium in the dynamic public 
good game that we study with and without reversibility.11 In our paper we use the 
 characterization presented there as a basic prediction for the players’ behavior in 
7 Battaglini, Nunnari, and Palfrey (2010) studied voluntary contribution only in the reversible case. The results 
presented in that working paper are now incorporated in the current expanded paper that includes also the irrevers-
ible case. 
8 Related experiments are presented by Saijo et al. (2009), who focus on an environment with static, state 
independent strategies, and Pevnitskaya and Ryvkin (2013), who focus on the effect of environmental context and 
termination uncertainty. The theoretical framework and experimental design of these papers do not investigate the 
effect of irreversibility on actions. 
9 See Dal Bó and Fréchette (2014) for a survey. 
10 Note also that, while in a prisoner’s dilemma there is a dominant strategy, a  one-period version of our game 
would have no dominant strategies. 
11 Previously, work on the reversible case was done in a framework of a linear differentiable game with qua-
dratic preferences (Fershtman and Nitzan 1991 and Dockner and Long 1993, among others). Contribution games 
with irreversibility are studied in the literature on monotone games, see Matthews (2013) (and the references cited 
there) for a recent comprehensive analysis. These works, however, assume the players have a dominant strategy and 
it can be applied only to special cases that do not include our environment. 
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the laboratory, integrating it with an analysis of other nonstationary equilibria for 
completeness.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section I, we present the 
model and its solutions: the first best solution; the equilibrium when the public good 
is reversible; the equilibrium when the public good is irreversible; and the equilib-
rium predictions with  nonstationary subgame perfect equilibria. In Section II, we 
describe the experimental design. Sections III and IV discusses the results of the 
experiment. Section V compares the results in our dynamic environment with the 
results of previous experiments on static public good games. Section VI concludes.
I. The Model
Here we describe a simplified version of the model in Battaglini, Nunnari, and 
Palfrey (2014), which we will use in our experimental design. Consider an economy 
with  n agents who interact for an infinite number of periods. There are two goods: a 
private good  x and a public good  g . The level of consumption of the private good by 
agent  j in period  t is  x t j , the level of the public good in period  t is  g t . The utility  u j 
of agent  j can be written as
  u j =  ∑ 
t=1
∞
  δ t−1 [ x t j + α  √ __ g t] ,
where  δ ∈ [0, 1] is a common discount factor, and  α > 0 is a constant. The pri-
vate consumption good is nondurable, the public good is durable and does not 
depreciate between periods. Thus, if the level of public good at time  t − 1 is  g t−1 
and the total investment in the public good is  i t , then the level of public good at 
time  t will be
  g t =  g t−1 +  i t . 
It is convenient to distinguish the state variable at  t ,  g t−1 , from the policy choice  g t . 
In the remainder, we denote  y t =  g t−1 +  i t as the new level of public good after an 
investment  i t when the last period’s level of the public good is  g t−1 . The initial stock 
of public good is  g 0 ≥ 0 , exogenously given. Public policies are chosen as in the 
classic free rider problem. In each period, each agent  j is endowed with  w = W/n 
units of private good and chooses on its own how to allocate its endowment between 
an individual investment in the public good (which is shared by all agents) and 
private consumption, taking as given the strategies of the other agents. The key 
difference with respect to the static free rider problem is that the public good can be 
accumulated over time. The level of the state variable  g , therefore, creates a dynamic 
linkage across policy making periods.
We consider two alternative economic environments. In a reversible investment 
Economy (RIE), the level of individual investment can be negative, with the 
 constraint that  i t j ∈  [− g t /n, W/n]  ∀ j , where  i t j = W/n −  x t j is the investment by 
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agent  j .12 In an irreversible investment Economy (IIE), an agent’s investment cannot 
be negative and must satisfy  i t j ∈  [0, W/n]  ∀ j. 
The RIE corresponds to a situation in which the public investment can be scaled 
back in the future at no cost. An example can be an art collection or land for com-
mon use. The IIE corresponds to situations in which once the investment is done it 
cannot be undone. This seems the appropriate case for investments in public infra-
structure (for example, a bridge or a road), the level of global warming, or less 
tangible investments like “social capital.” In this environment, private consumption 
cannot be negative and the total  economy-wide investment in the public good in any 
period is given by the sum of the agent investments.
A. The Planner’s solution
As a benchmark with which to compare the equilibrium allocations, we first ana-
lyze the sequence of public policies that would be chosen by a benevolent plan-
ner who maximizes the sum of utilities of the agents. This is the welfare optimum 
because the private good enters linearly in each agent’s utility function.
Denote the planner’s policy as  y P (g) and consider first an economy with revers-
ible investment. As shown by Battaglini, Nunnari, and Palfrey (2014), the objective 
function of the planner is continuous, strictly concave and differentiable, and a solu-
tion of its maximization problem exists and is unique. The optimal policies have an 
intuitive characterization. When the accumulated level of public good is low, the 
marginal benefit of investing in  g is high, and the planner finds it optimal to invest as 
much as possible: in this case  y P (g) = W + g and  ∑ j=1 n  x j = 0 . When  g is high, 
the planner will be able to reach the level of public good  y P ∗ that solves the planner’s 
unconstrained problem
(1)  y P ∗ =  ( αn ______ 2(1 − δ)) 
2 .
The investment function, therefore, has the following simple structure. For 
 g <  y P ∗ − W ,  y P ∗ is not feasible: the planner invests everything and  y P (g) = g + W . 
For  g ≥  y P ∗ − W , instead, investment stops at  y P (g) =  y P ∗. This invest-
ment function implies that the planner’s economy converges to the steady 
state  y P o =  y P ∗. In this steady state, without loss of generality, we can set  x j (g) =  (W + g −  y P (g)) /n  ∀ j .13
The planner’s optimum for the IIE case is not very much different. The planner 
finds it optimal to invest all resources for  g ≤  y P ∗ − W . For  g ∈  ( y P ∗ − W,  y P ∗) , the 
planner finds it optimal to stop investing at  y P ∗, as before. For  g ≥  y P ∗,  y P ∗ is not 
feasible, so it is optimal to invest  0 , and to set  y P (g) = g . This difference in the 
 investment function for IIE, however, is essentially irrelevant for the optimal path 
12 This constraint guarantees that (out of equilibrium) the sum of reductions in  g can not be larger than the stock 
of  g . The analysis would be similar if we allow each agent to withdraw up to  g . In this case, however, we would have 
to assume a rationing rule in case the individuals withdraw more than  g . 
13 Indeed, the planner is indifferent regarding the distribution of private consumption. 
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and the steady state of the economy. Starting from any  g 0 lower than the steady state 
y P ∗, levels of  g larger or equal than  y P ∗ are impossible to reach, and the irreversibility 
constraint does not affect the optimal investment path.
B. reversible investment Economies
We first describe equilibrium behavior when the investment in the public good 
is reversible. We focus on continuous, symmetric  Markov-perfect equilibria, where 
all agents use the same strategy, and these strategies are  time-independent func-
tions of the state,  g . A strategy is a pair  (x( · ), i( · )) : where  x(g) is an agent’s level 
of consumption and  i(g) is an agent’s level of investment in the public good in 
state  g . Associated with any equilibrium is a value function  v r (g) which specifies 
the expected discounted future payoff to an agent when the state is  g . The optimi-
zation problem for agent  j if the current level of public good is  g , the agent’s value 
function is  v r (g) , and other agents’ investment strategies are given by  x r (g) , can be 
represented as
(2)  max 
y, x  
⎧
 
⎪
⎨⎪
⎩
x + α  √ __ g + δ  v r ( y)
   such that x + y − g = W − (n − 1)  x r (g)    
W − (n − 1)  x r (g) + g − y ≥ 0  
x ≤ g/n + W/n
 
⎫
 
⎪
⎬⎪
⎭
 .
Contrary to the planner, agent  j cannot choose  y directly: it chooses only its level 
of private consumption and the level of its own contribution to the public invest-
ment. The agent, however, realizes that given the other agents’ level of private con-
sumption  (n − 1)  x r (g) , his/her investment ultimately determines  y . It is therefore 
as if agent  j chooses  x and  y , provided that he satisfies the feasibility constraints. The 
first constraint is the resource constraint: it requires that total resources,  W , are equal 
to the sum of private consumption,  (n − 1)  x r (g) + x , plus the public investment, 
y − g . The second constraint requires that private consumption  x is nonnegative. 
The third constraint requires that no agent can reduce  y by more than his share  g/n .
In a symmetric equilibrium, all agents consume the same fraction of resources, so 
agent  j takes as given that in state  g the other agents each consume
  x r (g) =  W + g −  y r (g)  __________n , 
where  y r (g) is the equilibrium level of investment in state  g . Substituting the first 
constraint of (2) in the objective function, recognizing that agent  j takes the  strategies 
of the other agents as given, and ignoring irrelevant constants, the agent’s problem 
can be written as
(3)  max 
y
 { 
α  √ __ y − y + δ  v r ( y)   
y ≤  W + g _____n +  n − 1 _____n  y r (g), y ≥  n − 1 _____n  y r (g)
 }  ,
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where it should be noted that agent  j takes  y r (g) as given.14 The objective function 
shows that an agent has a clear trade off: a dollar in investment produces a marginal 
benefit  α __ 2  √ __ g + δ  v r ′ ( y) , the marginal cost is  − 1 , a dollar less in private consumption. 
The first constraint shows that at the maximum the agent can increase the investment 
of the other players  (i.e.,  n − 1 ___n  y r (g)) by  W + g ____n . The second constraint makes clear 
that at most the agent can consume his endowment  W/n and his share of  g ,  g/n .
We restrict attention to equilibria in which the objective function in (3) is strictly 
concave, and we refer to these equilibria as concave equilibria. Depending on the 
state  g , the solution of (3) falls in one of two cases: the first case corresponds to the 
situation where the first constraint in (3) is binding, so all resources are devoted to 
investment in the public good. In this case,  x r (g) = 0 ,  y r (g) = W + g , and invest-
ment by each agent is  i r (g) =  W __n . In the second case, private consumption is pos-
itive, that is  x r (g) > 0 , and the solution is characterized by a unique public good 
level  y r ∗ =  ( αn _____ 2(n − δ)) 2 . In this second case, the investment by each agent is equal to 
i r (g) =  1 _n[ y r ∗ − g] and per capita private consumption is  x r (g) =  W + g −  y r ∗_______ n > 0 . 
The first case is possible if and only if  W ≤  y r ∗ −  g r , that is, if  g is below some 
threshold  g r defined by:  g r = max {  y r ∗ − W, 0} . We summarize this in the follow-
ing proposition, which also proves the existence of an equilibrium and its unique-
ness when  v r (g) is strictly concave.
PROPOSITION 1: in the game with reversible investment, a strictly concave 
equilibrium exists and it is unique. in this equilibrium, public investment is 
 y r (g) = min {W + g,  y r ∗} , where  y r ∗ =  ( αn _____ 2(n − δ)) 2 <  y P ∗.
PROOF: 
See Appendix A.
The public good function  y r (g) is qualitatively similar to the corresponding 
planner’s function  y P (g) . The main difference is that  y r ∗ <  y P ∗ and  g r <  g P , so 
public good provision is typically smaller (and always smaller in the steady state). 
This is a dynamic version of the usual free rider problem associated with public 
good provision: each agent invests less than is socially optimal because he/she 
fails to fully internalize all agents’ utilities. Part of the free rider problem can be 
seen from (3): in choosing investment, agents count only their marginal benefit, 
 u′ ( y) + δ  v r ′ ( y) , rather than  n u′ ( y) + δn  v r ′ ( y) , but all the marginal costs ( − 1 ). In 
this dynamic model, however, there is an additional effect that reduces incentives 
to invest, called the dynamic free rider problem. A marginal increase in  g has two 
effects. An immediate effect, corresponding to the increase in resources available in 
the following period:  g . But there is also a delayed effect on next period’s invest-
ment: the increase in  g triggers a reduction in the future investment of all the other 
agents through an increase in  x r (g) : for any level of  g >  g r ,  y r (g) will be kept at  y r ∗. 
14 Since  y r (g) is the equilibrium level of investment, in a symmetric equilibrium  (n − 1)  y r (g)/n is the level of 
investment that agent  j expects from all the other agents, and that he/she takes as given in equilibrium. 
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In a symmetric equilibrium, if agent  j increases the investment by one dollar, he will 
trigger a reduction in future investment by all agents by  1/n dollars; the net value of 
the increase in  g for  j will be only  δ/n .
C. irreversible investment Economies
When the stock of the public good cannot be reduced, the optimization problem 
of an agent can be written like (2), but with an additional constraint: the individual 
level of investment cannot be negative or, in other words, each agent’s private con-
sumption cannot exceed his endowment,  x j (g) ≤ W/n . Following similar steps as 
before, we can write the maximization problem faced by an agent as
(4)   max 
y
  { 
α  √ __ y − y + δ  v ir ( y)    
y ≤  W + g _____n +  n − 1 _____n  y ir (g), y ≥ g +  n − 1 _____n (  y ir (g) − g)
 } ,  
where the only difference with respect to (3) is the second constraint: the new level 
of public good cannot be lower than  g plus the investments from all the other agents.
As pointed out in Section IA, when public investments are efficient, irreversibil-
ity is irrelevant for the equilibrium allocation. The investment path chosen by the 
planner is unaffected because the planner’s choice is time consistent: he never finds 
it optimal to increase  g if he plans to reduce it later. In the concave equilibrium char-
acterized in the previous section, the investment function may be inefficient, but it 
is weakly increasing in the state. Agents invest until they reach a steady state, and 
then they stop. It may seem intuitive, therefore, that irreversibility is irrelevant in 
this case too, but this intuition is not correct. To the contrary, irreversibility destroys 
the concave equilibrium we characterized for reversible investment economies and 
induces the agents to significantly increase their investment, leading to a signifi-
cantly higher unique steady state. Intuitively, the reason is that the agents no longer 
have to worry about the dynamic free rider problem: the irreversibility constraint 
creates a “commitment device” for the future; the agents know that  g cannot be 
reduced by the others (or their future selves).
PROPOSITION 2: in an economy with irreversible investment, a weakly concave 
equilibrium exists. Any weakly concave equilibrium, moreover, is associated to the 
same unique steady state equal to  y ir ∗ =  ( α _____ 2(1 − δ)) 2 . This steady state level is strictly 
greater than  y r ∗ and strictly smaller than  y P ∗ for any  n > 1 and any  δ ∈ [0, 1) .
PROOF: 
See Appendix A.
The first part of Proposition 2 follows directly as a special case of proposition 1 
in Battaglini, Nunnari, and Palfrey (2014), where it is established that the dynamic 
free rider game with irreversibility admits an equilibrium with standard  concavity 
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 properties. The second part, uniqueness of the steady state, is established in 
Appendix A. In this steady state, the public good stock is strictly smaller than the one 
accumulated by a benevolent planner, but strictly higher than the one accumulated 
in the unique concave equilibrium of RIE. This steady state,  y ir ∗ =  ( α _____ 2(1 − δ)) 2 , is 
exactly the same level that an agent alone would accumulate and it is independent 
of  n .
The equilibrium selection based on Markov strategies therefore leads to a clear 
prediction that the irreversibility of investment will generate a higher level of invest-
ment in each period, as well as a higher steady state of the public good. The intuition 
for this is straightforward: the impossibility to convert today’s investment back into 
private consumption at a future dates, eliminates worries about future agents’ incen-
tives to plunder the current public good investments. In other words, irreversibility 
mitigates the dynamic free rider problem. Moreover, the investment function in the 
equilibrium described in Proposition 2 is different than the one for the reversible 
investment case, where the agents would either find it optimal to invest everything, 
or just enough to reach the steady state. In contrast, in the irreversible investment 
case, the investment function increases gradually over time,15 and the steady state is 
reached only asymptotically.
D. cooperation using  Nonstationary strategies
We have restricted our attention to symmetric Markov perfect equilibria. However, 
the voluntary contribution game we study is an infinite horizon dynamic game with 
many subgame perfect equilibria. The Markovian assumption of stationary strate-
gies is very restrictive and it is possible that some other equilibria can sustain more 
efficient outcomes through the use of  history-dependent strategies that use punish-
ments and rewards for past actions. As we show below, in economies with reversible 
investment, the optimal solution can indeed be supported as the outcome of a sub-
game perfect equilibrium.
PROPOSITION 3: There is a  δ ˆr ∈ [0, 1), such that, for all  δ >  δ ˆr , the efficient 
investment path characterized by the optimal solution is a subgame Perfect Nash 
Equilibrium of the voluntary contribution game with reversible investment.
In Appendix A, we derive  nonstationary strategies for the voluntary contribution 
game with reversible investment whose outcome is the efficient level of public good 
(the optimal solution), and show that these strategies are a subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium.16
15 This property of gradually increasing contributions in our model is reminiscent of a property of the repeated 
game equilibria found elsewhere in the literature (see, for example, Marx and Matthews 2000), but the intuition 
behind it is quite different. Here gradualism is needed in order to smooth out the value function of the Markov 
equilibrium at the steady state, while elsewhere gradualism follows from the  non-Markov repeated game strategies 
that are used to enforce efficient equilibria. 
16 Our goal is to show that the optimal solution is the outcome of some subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the 
game. We do not claim that the strategies proposed in the proof of Proposition 3 are the best punishment schemes, 
and there may be different  nonstationary strategies that work for lower  δ . 
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The strategy for each agent is to allocate the optimal level of investment to pub-
lic good production,  (  y P ∗ (g) − g)/n , and to consume the remainder. A deviation 
from this investment behavior by any agent is punished by reversion to the unique 
concave Markov perfect equilibrium characterized in Section IB. This is a simple 
strategy that involves the harshest individually rational punishment for deviation 
from cooperation: whenever  g >  y r ∗ and a deviation is observed, the public good 
will revert to  y r ∗ and it will stay at this level for all future periods.
When investment is irreversible, the efficient outcome cannot be sustained with 
strategies similar to the ones proposed above for environments with reversible 
investment. Matthews (2013) shows that, with discounting, no subgame perfect 
equilibrium of a general family of dynamic contribution games is efficient, in the 
sense of supporting the optimal public good stock in each period. In particular, that 
result applies to our environment, implying the following proposition as corollary.
PROPOSITION 4: There is no  δ ˆir ∈ [0, 1), such that, for all  δ >  δ ˆir , the optimal 
investment strategies are a subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the voluntary con-
tribution game with irreversible investment.
The intuition behind Proposition 4 is that the potential for punishment is signifi-
cantly dampened by the irreversibility constraint. Whenever  g >  y ir ∗ and a devia-
tion is observed, agents cannot disinvest down to  y ir ∗ , and the harshest punishment 
is characterized by no investment and a constant stock in all periods following the 
first deviation.
Since many equilibria generally exist, a refinement is always needed for com-
parative statics or policy evaluation. It is standard practice in applied work to use 
as a solution concept the most efficient subgame perfect equilibrium (in our model 
the solution with the highest investment in  g ). The propositions presented above 
are important because they allow us to cleanly separate the time path of investment 
behavior implied by the Markov equilibrium discussed in the previous section from 
the time path of investment behavior in the best subgame perfect ( non-Markov) 
equilibrium. Let  g t M, r and  g t M, ir denote the equilibrium stock of accumulated public 
good at time  t in the Markov equilibria discussed in the previous section with revers-
ibility and irreversibility, respectively. Let  g t s, r and  g t s, ir be the corresponding stock 
of accumulated public good observable at time  t in the best subgame perfect equilib-
rium. We have:
COROLLARY 1: There is a  δ ∗ ∈ [0, 1), such that, for  δ >  δ ∗ , we have:
•	 	 g t M, r <  g t M, ir on the equilibrium path.
•	 	 g t s, ir ≤  g t s, r on the equilibrium path.
The first bullet point can be established using Propositions 1 and 2, while the sec-
ond bullet point follows from Propositions 3 and 4. Corollary 1 establishes that 
the comparative static predictions implied by the two different equilibrium con-
cepts (Markov versus best SPE) are completely opposed with respect to the effect 
of reversibility versus irreversibility on investment. This theoretical insight thus 
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provides two starkly opposite predictions about efficiency that will be useful for 
interpreting the results of the experiment.
II. Experimental Design
The experiments were conducted at the Social Science Experimental Laboratory 
(SSEL) using students from the California Institute of Technology, and at the 
Columbia Experimental Laboratory for the Social Sciences (CELSS) using students 
from Columbia University. Subjects were recruited from pools of volunteer subjects, 
maintained by SSEL and CELSS. Ten sessions were run, using a total of 129 sub-
jects. No subject participated in more than one session. Half of the sessions were for 
Reversible Investment Economies and half for Irreversible Investment Economies. 
Six sessions were conducted using three person groups, and four with five person 
groups. In all sessions the discount factor was  δ = 0.75 , and the multiplier of the 
 current-period payoff from the public good was  α = 4, that is,  u(g) = 4  √ __ g. In 
the 3 person groups, we used the parameters  W = 60 , while in the 5 person groups 
W = 80 . It is useful to emphasize that, as proven in the previous sections, given 
these parameters the steady state is uniquely defined both for the RIE and IIE game 
and for all treatments.
Discounted payoffs were induced by a random termination rule by rolling a die 
after each period in front of the room, with the outcome determining whether the 
game continued to another period (with probability  0.75 ) or was terminated (with 
probability  0.25 ). The  n = 5 sessions were conducted with 15 subjects, divided 
into 3 groups of 5 members each. The  n = 3 sessions were conducted with 12 sub-
jects, divided into 4 groups of 3 members each.17 Groups stayed the same through-
out the periods of a given match, and subjects were randomly rematched into groups 
between matches. A match consisted of one  multi-period play of the game, which 
continued until one of the die rolls eventually ended the match. As a result, different 
matches lasted for different lengths (that is, for a different number of periods). In all 
sessions, subjects interacted for ten matches. Table 1 summarizes the design and the 
theoretical properties of the equilibrium for the four treatments.
Before the first match, instructions18 were read aloud, followed by a practice 
match and a comprehension quiz to verify that subjects understood the details of the 
environment including how to compute payoffs. The current period’s payoffs from 
the public good stock (called project size in the experiment) was displayed graphi-
cally, with stock of public good on the horizontal axis and the payoff on the vertical 
axis. Subjects could click anywhere on the curve and the payoff for that level of 
public good appeared on the screen. Subjects received information about the total 
investment in the public good as well as about the individual investments of other 
subjects in their group, at the end of each period. At the end of the last match each 
subject was paid privately in cash the sum of his or her earnings over all matches 
17 One of the  N = 3 sessions used nine subjects. 
18 Sample instructions are reported in Appendix C. Subject decisions, interactions, and feedback were imple-
mented in a computer network using the open source interactive game software, Multistage (http://software.ssel.
caltech.edu/). 
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plus a  show-up fee of $10. Earnings ranged from approximately $20 to $50, with 
sessions lasting between one and two hours. There was considerable range in the 
earnings and length across sessions because of the random stopping rule.
III. Experimental Results
A. Public Good Outcomes
We start the analysis of the experimental results by looking at the  long-run stock 
of public good by treatment. We consider as the  long-run stock of public good, 
the stock reached by a group after ten periods of play.19 Table 2 compares the the-
oretical and observed levels of public good by treatment. In order to aggregate 
across groups, we use the median level of the public good from all groups in a given 
treatment in periods  9–11  ( y mdn Lr ) . Similar results hold if we use a different subset 
of periods around ten, or look at the mean or other measures of central tenden-
cy.20 We compare this to the stock predicted by the Markov perfect equilibrium of 
the game after ten periods  ( y MP Lr) , and to the stock accumulated in the optimal solu-
tion after ten periods  ( y P Lr ) .21
How do groups arrive at these period 10 stocks of public good? Figures 1 and 
2 give us a richer picture, showing the time series of the stock of public good by 
 treatment.22 The horizontal axis is the time period and the vertical axis is the stock 
19 In the experiment, the length of a match is stochastic and determined by the roll of a die. No match lasted 
longer than 17 periods and we have very few observations for periods  11–17. Detailed information on the number 
of observations for each period is reported in Tables B1 and B2 in Appendix B. 
20 In Appendix B, we report averages, medians, and standard errors of the stock of the public good by period 
for each treatment. When discussing long-run outcomes, we pool together periods  9–11 to consider a larger sample. 
The median in Table 2 is computed from 17 observations for RIE with  n = 3 , 15 observations for RIE with  n = 5 , 
68 observations for IIE with  n = 3 , and 32 observations for IIE with  n = 5 . In spite of the lower number of obser-
vations, results are unchanged when we consider only period 10 stocks as long run outcomes. 
21 Note that the median stock predicted for periods  9–11 is the stock predicted for period 10. 
22 These and subsequent figures show data from the first ten periods. Data from later periods ( 11–13 for RIE and 
 11–17 for IIE) are excluded from the graphs because there were so few observations. The data from later periods are 
reported in Appendix B and included in all the statistical analyses. 
Table 2—Long-Run Stock of Public Good, Theory versus Results
Treatment  n  y mdn Lr  y MP Lr  y P Lr 
Reversible investment (RIE) 3 16 7.11 576
Reversible investment (RIE) 5 26 5.54 800
Irreversible investment (IIE) 3 306 43.64 576
Irreversible investment (IIE) 5 350 42.20 800
Table 1—Experimental Design, Equilibrium, and Planner Steady States
Treatment  n  W Sessions Subjects Groups  y MPE ∗  y P ∗
RIE 3 60 3 33 110 7.11 576
RIE 5 80 2 30 60 5.54 1,600
IIE 3 60 3 36 120 64 576
IIE 5 80 2 30 60 64 1,600
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of the public good. We use the median level of the public good from all groups in 
a given treatment. Superimposed on the graphs are the theoretical time paths cor-
responding to the Markov perfect equilibria (represented with dashed lines) and 
to the optimal solution. Table 2, Figure 1, and Figure 2 exhibit several systematic 
regularities, which we discuss below in comparison with the theoretical time paths.
Finding 1: Irreversible investment leads to higher public good production than 
reversible investment. According to  Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests,23 the stock of 
public good is significantly lower in RIE than in IIE in every single period. This 
 difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level (  p < 0.01 ) for periods 
 1–10 for both group sizes (see Table 3, columns 1 and 2). Not only are the differ-
ences statistically significant, but they are large in magnitude. The median stock of 
23 Unless otherwise noted, our significance tests are based on  Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests. The null hypoth-
esis of a  Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test is that the underlying distributions of the two samples are the same. We are 
treating as unit of observation a single group. The results are unchanged if we use  t -tests for differences in means 
(see Table B5 in Appendix B). We take into account the panel structure of the data by clustering the standard errors 
of these tests by groups composed of the same subjects. 
Figure 1. Median Time Paths of the Stock of  g , RIE versus IIE
Figure 2. Median Time Paths of Normalized Efficiency, RIE versus IIE
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public good is many times greater in the IIE treatment than in the RIE treatment, 
averaged across all periods for which we have data (154 in IIE versus 24 in RIE for 
n = 3 ; 155 in IIE versus 43 in RIE for  n = 5 ). The difference between the two 
treatments is relatively small in the initial periods, but it increases sharply as more 
periods are played. By period 10, the difference is very large (293.5 versus 10 for 
n = 3 and 367 versus 22 for  n = 5 ).
Finding 2: Both reversible and irreversible investment lead to significantly 
inefficient  long-run public good levels. The optimal steady state is  y ∗ = 576 for 
n = 3 and  y ∗ = 1,600 for  n = 5 , and the optimal investment policy is the fastest 
approach: invest  W in every period until  y ∗ is achieved. After 10 periods, the median 
stock of public good achieved with the optimal investment trajectory is 576 with 
n = 3 and 800 with  n = 5 . In the experiments, the median stock of public good 
levels out at about 12 ( n = 3 ) or 33 ( n = 5 ) under reversible investment econo-
mies, while it keeps growing, but at an inefficiently slow pace, under irreversible 
investment. The median stock in periods  9–11 is 16 in RIE with  n = 3 , 26 in RIE 
with  n = 5 , 306 in IIE with  n = 3 , and 350 in IIE with  n = 5 . In all treatments, 
the average stock of public good in periods  9–11 is significantly smaller than the 
level predicted by the optimal solution (the level attainable investing  W each period) 
according to the results of a  t -test on the equality of means with standard errors 
clustered at the group level ( p < 0.01 ).
Finding 3: In IIE, the efficiency of  long-run public good levels is midway between 
the planner solution and the prediction of the MPE. In RIE, efficiency converges 
close to MPE steady state. For each period  t , we define a normalized efficiency 
measure as  E t =   ( y t −  y MP t )  ________ ( y P t −  y MP t )  , where  y MP 
t , the public good stock predicted by the 
MPE, is the lower bound for efficiency,  y P t , the public good stock in the planner 
solution, is the upper bound, and  y t is the median observed public good stock in 
period  t . Figure 2 shows the evolution of  E t over time for the two treatments. In peri-
ods  9–11,  E t ranges between 0.02 and 0.04 with reversible investment and ranges 
between 0.39 and 0.53 with irreversible investment. We highlight two results. First, 
Table 3—Period-by-Period p-values of Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Tests for Public 
Good Stocks
Period RIE3/IIE3 RIE5/IIE5 RIE3/RIE5 IIE3/IIE5
 1  0.000  0.005  0.000  0.000 
 2  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000 
 3  0.000  0.000  0.061  0.000 
 4  0.000  0.000  0.057  0.003 
 5  0.000  0.000  0.049  0.010 
 6  0.000  0.000  0.009  0.144 
 7  0.000  0.000  0.259  0.284 
 8  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.580 
 9  0.000  0.001  0.047  0.668 
 10  0.006  0.001  0.627  0.313 
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IIE is several orders of magnitude more efficient than RIE. Second, RIE efficiency 
is essentially at the lower bound in the long run, indicating convergence to the pre-
diction of the MPE, while IIE efficiency is always very high.24
From Proposition 3, we know that, for the parameters of the experiment, almost 
efficient levels of the public good can be supported as the outcome of the  riE game 
using  nonstationary subgame perfect strategies.25 In the  iiE games, on the other 
hand, the optimal solution cannot be supported by any subgame perfect equilibrium 
with  nonstationary strategies when there is discounting. This is in stark contrast with 
the unique Markov perfect equilibria derived in Sections IB and IC, which imply 
the opposite comparative static: the long-run level of the public good is predicted to 
be ten times as large with irreversible investment than with reversible investment.
The analysis of the public good outcomes suggests that the predictions of the 
Markov perfect equilibrium are substantially more accurate than the prediction of 
the “best” subgame perfect equilibrium (that is the Pareto superior equilibrium from 
the point of view of the agents), in terms of both the  long-run stock of public good in 
RIE and the effect of reversibility. On the other hand, the MPE that we have adopted 
as benchmark does not capture finer details of the data, such as the initially high 
levels of investment in both the RIE and IIE regimes, and the relatively high long 
run stock of public good in IIE. In Section IIIB, we explore these discrepancies by 
focusing on individual investing behavior.
B. investing Behavior
How much do individual agents invest in the public good? Figure 3 shows the 
time series of the median investment in the public good by treatment. The horizontal 
axis is the time period and the vertical axis is the investment in the public good. The 
maximum amount each agent can allocate to investment is the same in each period, 
and it is given by  W/n , which is equal to 20 for  n = 3 and 16 for  n = 5 . The 
minimum amount each agent can invest is always zero in the irreversible investment 
treatment, but it depends on the stock at the beginning of the period in the reversible 
investment treatment (since each agent can disinvest up to  g/n units of the public 
good). For each period, we use the median level of individual investment from all 
subjects in a given treatment. Similar results hold if we use the mean or other mea-
sures of central tendency.
Figure 3 shows a series of interesting patterns. First, the median individual invest-
ment is always higher with irreversible investment than with reversible investment 
in periods  1–10. Second, the level of investment is decreasing, with median invest-
ment converging quickly to values around zero for the reversible investment econo-
mies and steadily decreasing toward zero for the irreversible economies.
24 Both reversible and irreversible investment lead to normalized efficiency level significantly different from 
zero, that is, the efficiency levels predicted by the MPE. As discussed above, while this difference is large for IIE, it 
is negligible and not economically significant for RIE. 
25 With the parameters of the experiment, the public good stock sustainable with the  nonstationary strategies 
proposed in the proof of Proposition 3 is 520 (versus an efficient level of 576) for  n = 3 and 1,404 (versus an effi-
cient level of 1,600) for  n = 5 . This steady state is reached in 9 periods (with investment equal to  W = 60 in the 
first 8 periods) for  n = 3 and in 18 periods (with investment equal to  W = 80 in the first 17 periods) for  n = 5 . 
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How do these levels of individual investment compare to the theoretical predic-
tions? The median time paths from Figure 3 are qualitatively in line with the predicted 
time paths: with reversible investment, the theory predicts positive investment only 
in the first period (when the equilibrium steady state is reached) and zero investment 
from the second period on; with irreversible investment, the theory predicts positive 
investment in each period, but at a monotonically decreasing pace (with conver-
gence to the equilibrium steady state only asymptotically). Again, however, there 
are some differences between the finer details of the theoretical predictions and the 
data, that mirror the findings in Section IIIA. We observe  overinvestment in the early 
periods: while individual investment is predicted to be less than 4 units in the first 
period for all treatments, we observe medians between 10 and 15. In the reversible 
economies, this  overinvestment is corrected in the later periods: the median invest-
ment falls sharply to zero or below and a large fraction of individuals disinvests, 
with higher early  overinvestment followed by higher disinvestment. In RIE, negative 
investment accounts for 28 percent (for  n = 3 ) or 36 percent (for  n = 5 ) of all 
decisions. The proportion of negative investment decisions increases with the period 
of play, within a single match.
The game we study is a dynamic game with an evolving state variable. It follows 
that, to better compare the observed level of investment with the theoretical pre-
dictions, we need to take into account the state variable faced by each agent when 
making an allocation decision, that is the stock of the public good at the beginning 
of a period. For each subject in each period, we calculate the difference between his 
observed behavior and the investment predicted by the theory given the public good 
stock in his group in that period. Figure 4 shows the time series of the median of 
this difference. This series starts out significantly above zero for all treatments but 
decreases as more periods of the same match are played, suggesting that subjects’ 
decisions respond to the evolution of the state variable. Notice that this pattern leads 
to public good outcomes that are in line with MPE steady states for reversible econ-
omies, but not for irreversible economies: in the former, subjects can correct the 
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initial  overinvestment with negative investment, while in the latter the equilibrium 
investment for any level above the steady state ( 64 ) is bound to be zero and the ini-
tial  overinvestment persists. We summarize these findings below.
Finding 4: In all treatments, there is  overinvestment relative to the equilibrium 
in the early periods. This is followed by negative investment approaching the the-
oretical predictions in RIE, while the  overinvestment decreases but persists in IIE. 
In all treatments, groups overshoot the equilibrium in early periods: the difference 
between the average investment in periods  1–2 and the predicted investment in these 
same periods is statistically significant at the 1 percent level for all treatments. In 
RIE, this overshooting is largely corrected in later periods via disinvestment. When 
investment is reversible, convergence of the public good stock is close to equilib-
rium, with the difference between the median public good levels and the equilib-
rium public good levels in the last 4 periods of data measuring around 5 units of 
the public good with  n = 3 and around 28 units with  n = 5 . In IIE, investment 
remains positive but is monotonically decreasing with periods of play (in the same 
match).26 Given the public good stock by the end of period 2 is already above the 
predicted steady state level (64), the positive—albeit slower—investment flow in 
the following periods brings the  long-run level of public good to be four (295.5 ver-
sus 64 for  n = 3 ) and five times (324 versus 64 for  n = 5 ) larger than predicted. 
The  difference between the average public good stock and the predicted public good 
stock in periods  6–10 is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
C. The Effect of Group size
According to the theory, the public good accumulation has a small sensitivity to 
group size: for both accumulation mechanisms (reversible or irreversible invest-
ments), the public good stock is predicted to be larger in smaller groups in every 
period, but this difference ranges between 1.36 and 2.44 (always less than 5 percent 
26 Recall that in the IIE equilibrium, contribution is predicted to be positive in every period, and to monotoni-
cally decline to zero. 
Figure 4. Median Difference with MPE Investment
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of the group  per period endowment). We discuss below the observed difference in 
public good accumulation between  three-member and  five-member groups.
Finding 5: Public good stocks are higher in five member groups than in three 
member groups. This difference, however, is statistically significant only in half of 
the periods. For the same accumulation mechanism, the average and median stock 
of public good is higher with five-member groups than with three-member groups 
in every single period. However, this difference is statistically significant at conven-
tional levels ( p < 0.05 ) only for periods 1, 2, 5, 6, 8, and 9 in RIE; and for periods 
 1–5 in IIE (see Table 3, columns 3 and 4).
D. The Effect of Experience
As the previous sections show, across periods of the same game, subjects’ invest-
ment behavior gets closer to equilibrium. It is therefore natural to ask whether we 
observe a similar pattern across matches. Do subjects choose allocations closer to 
the equilibrium when they are more experienced? Or do they still  overinvest in early 
periods and reduce investment in later periods, even after many matches of the same 
( multi-period) game?
Finding 6: With reversible investment, public good stocks are not affected by 
experience. With irreversible investment, public good stocks are higher in later 
matches. We compare public good stocks in each period in early (1–5) versus late 
(6–10) matches. Figure 5 shows the median time paths of the public good stock 
for early and late matches separately, for each treatment. In RIE, as subjects play 
more matches within the same session the stock of the public good is unaffected in 
periods  1–10.27 In IIE, as subjects play more matches within the same session, the 
accumulated levels of the public good grow larger: public good stocks are higher in 
late matches for all periods in both group sizes. With  n = 3 , this difference is sta-
tistically significant at the 1 percent level in periods  2–7 and 9, at the 5 percent level 
in periods 8. With  n = 5 , this difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level in period 1 and 3, at the 5 percent level in period 2.
IV. Explaining Differences with MPE
The aggregate outcomes presented in the previous section reflect the main qual-
itative features from the MPE: both in RIE and IIE the accumulation path is ineffi-
ciently slow, the public good is  under-provided, and IIE induces significantly higher 
public good contributions than RIE. On the other hand, the MPE does not fully cap-
ture the complexity of individual behavior: the levels of public good stock are far 
from efficient but also far from the predictions of the Markov perfect equilibrium in 
the IIE environment; under RIE, public good levels exhibited a time path of early 
27 The only significant difference is in period 3 for  n = 3 , where the difference is significant at the 1 percent 
level. Notice that, for RIE, we are testing simultaneously 17 hypotheses and the probability of observing 1 signifi-
cant result just because of chance is 58 percent. 
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overproduction followed by negative investment. This is suggestive of some amount 
of cooperation that may be accountable in part by a failure of the Markovian assump-
tion and by  nonstationary strategic behavior involving punishments and rewards.
In this section, we investigate this possibility with two complementary methodol-
ogies. First, we look more closely at the individual investing behavior in the dynamic 
games: we test whether current individual investment decisions are correlated to 
past investments by other group members. Second, we propose a novel  experimental 
test of the Markovian assumption: we design a  one-period experiment where sub-
jects’ payoffs from the public good are given by the equilibrium value function of 
the unique concave Markov perfect equilibrium of the game with reversibility. If 
subjects in the fully dynamic game condition their strategies only on the public good 
stock, the individual incentives to contribute in the public good are exactly the same 
and we should observe no difference in behavior in this new treatment.
A.  History-Dependent Behavior
The tools by which players in this voluntary contribution game can reward or 
punish the other agents are limited. This is because punishments cannot be “tar-
geted”: an individual agent can only punish/reward other agents collectively by 
investing less/more in the public good in future periods. With this in mind, we 
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regress current individual investment decisions on last period’s average investment 
in their group, controlling for the level of public good. A positive coefficient would 
be consistent with some sort of nonstationary behavior, such as collective punish-
ments and rewards. We also include last period’s standard deviation of investment 
decisions in their group, as a high variance will indicate the presence of shirkers in 
their group, which could trigger (untargeted) punishments. A negative coefficient 
would be consistent with untargeted punishment of individual shirking behavior. 
Table 4 shows the results for each treatment. An observation is a single subject’s 
allocation decision in a single period. We include subject fixed effects to control for 
individual heterogeneity and cluster standard errors by group to take into account 
possible correlations among decisions taken by the same group.
Finding 7: Investment decisions depend on the contributions of others. The results 
for the four treatments are similar. The public good stock, as well as both “punish-
ment” variables have the predicted sign. With the exception of RIE with  n = 3 , 
the coefficient of the current stock of the public good is negative and significant. 
The average lagged investment is positive and highly significant in all treatments. 
The magnitude of its coefficient is around four times larger in IIE than in RIE. The 
lagged standard deviation coefficient is negative and significant in all treatments. 
The magnitude of its coefficient is around two (for  n = 3 ) and three (for  n = 5 ) 
times larger in RIE than in IIE. This seems to suggest  nonstationary behavior that 
may be consistent with strategic attempts to maintain  higher-than-equilibrium 
investment levels. To the extent that these attempts may have increased investment 
levels, the magnitude of such an increase is rather small in RIE but substantial in IIE, 
which probably accounts for some part of the large difference between IIE and RIE.
B. Direct Test of Markovian Behavior
To what extent are the models we use adequate to study this problem? What 
equilibrium concepts should be used? The latter question is particularly  important 
Table 4—Tobit Estimates for Individual Investment Decisions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Public good stock 0.009 −0.043 −0.008 −0.010
(0.028) (0.016) (0.003) (0.001)
Mean(Investment ) t−1 0.228 0.286 1.286 1.358(0.050) (0.060) (0.058) (0.095)
SD(Investment ) t−1 −0.729 −0.946 −0.281 −0.278(0.105) (0.107) (0.080) (0.130)
Constant −0.316 13.026 1.518 4.226
(0.988) (2.876) (1.132) (1.375)
Treatment RIE3 RIE5 IIE3 IIE5
Subject FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo r2 0.0456 0.0574 0.1910 0.2182
Observations 783 930 1,632 1,440
Note: Standard errors clustered by groups are in parentheses.
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in these dynamic games since, depending on the equilibrium concept, we can have 
very different predictions for the same model. While it is difficult to identify the 
equilibrium adopted by players, the analysis of public good outcomes and investing 
behavior provides some insights. As discussed above, we observe a consistent pat-
tern of behavior across groups, despite the fact that we have multiplicity of poten-
tial equilibria; with the exception of initial overinvestment, the investing behavior 
is tied to the evolution of the stock as qualitatively predicted by the theory; and, 
at least for RIE, the long term public good outcomes are close to the equilibrium 
steady states.
To further pursue this question, we construct a more direct test of the Markovian 
restriction, that is, of the assumption that players are  forward-looking and condition 
their strategy only on the stock of the public good at the beginning of the period, 
irrespective of the histories. In particular, we conduct a  one-period version of the 
reversible investment game, where the payoffs from the public good stock are com-
plemented by the equilibrium value functions of the unique concave Markov perfect 
equilibrium of the game. In each  one-period game, agent  j receives the following 
payoff:
  u j ( x j , y) =  x j + α  √ __ y + δ  v r ( y) ,
where  x j is the private consumption of agent  j ,  y is the  end-of-period public good 
stock, and  δ  v r ( y) is the discounted equilibrium value function from the dynamic 
game with reversible investment.
In each experimental session, subjects play for 40 matches. Contrary to the 
dynamic game, the length of each match is known and equal to one period. At the 
end of each  one-period match, subjects are reshuffled into new groups and the pub-
lic good stock starts out at a (potentially different) exogenous level. We use eight 
different  g 0 , to elicit an investment strategy (as a function of the state variable) com-
parable to the one observed in the fully dynamic game. Table 5 below summarizes 
the experimental design.
In each experimental session, each of the 8 values of  g 0 is used in 5 differ-
ent matches, in random order, for a total of 40 matches. The range  [0 –35] covers 
around 75 percent of observations in the dynamic game with  3-member groups and 
around 55 percent of observations in the dynamic game with  5-member groups. 
In the  one-period reduced form treatments, the unique equilibrium of the game 
 prescribes the same investment level predicted for the fully dynamic game under 
the Markovian assumption that subjects condition their strategies only on the public 
good stock. While there is no other equilibrium in this  one-period game, in the fully 
dynamic game there is a plethora of different subgame perfect equilibria that can 
sustain a higher level of investment with  nonstationary strategies. Therefore, if we 
observe similar behavior in the two treatments, this provides some additional evi-
dence for Markovian strategies in the fully dynamic game, as opposed to strategies 
that depend on history in a  non-Markov way. On the other hand, any differences in 
behavior provide indirect evidence for the presence of  non-Markov strategies that 
can arise in dynamic games.
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Figure 6 illustrates the median individual investment as a function of the ini-
tial stock for the  one-period  reduced-form games described above and for the fully 
dynamic games.28
Finding 8: For intermediate values of public good stock, the dynamic and static 
experiments produce similar results; for extreme values of the stock, the dynamic 
experiment produces a higher level of contributions. For  3-member groups, invest-
ment is significantly higher at the 5 percent level in the dynamic treatment for initial 
stocks of 0, 25, 30, and 35, and statistically indistinguishable for the remaining ini-
tial stocks. For  5-member groups, investment is significantly higher at the 5 percent 
level in the dynamic treatment for an initial stock of 30, and statistically indistin-
guishable for the remaining initial stocks.29
While there are some significant differences, these differences are small in 
magnitude (with the exception of initial stocks greater than 25 for  n = 3 ). This 
provides a mixed picture, but is suggestive that investment is somewhat higher 
in the fully dynamic game than in the reduced form game, perhaps as a conse-
quence of  nonstationary strategies. Of course, focusing on medians masks a lot of 
28 Since the  beginning-of-period stock in the dynamic games is endogenous and does not necessarily match the 
values used in the  one-period games, for these games we use the median investment levels for all  periods-groups that 
started with a public good stock in a six experimental units interval around the starting size used in the  one-period 
games. For example, the median investment corresponding to a  beginning-of-period stock of 20 is computed as the 
median investment from all  periods-groups starting at a stock between 17 and 23. This allows us to have a compa-
rable number of observations between  one-period and dynamic games. 
29 Table 6 reports the  p -values of these tests. If we use a 10 percent significance level, for both group sizes, 
investment is significantly higher in the dynamic treatment for initial stocks of 0, 25, 30, and 35, and statistically 
indistinguishable for the remaining initial stocks. 
Table 5—Experimental Design, One-Period Reduced-Form Treatments
 n  W Groups Subjects  g 0 
3 60 80 24 0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35
5 80 60 30 0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35
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Figure 6. Median Investment as a Function of Beginning-of-Period Stocks
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 heterogeneity across groups. In fact, the median investment in the  one-shot treat-
ment is in the interquartile range of the investments observed in the dynamic game 
for all initial stocks in both treatments, with the lone exception of an initial stock of 
35 for the 3-member groups. Regarding the high investment in the dynamic treat-
ment for 3-member groups and stocks greater than 25, this is due to a few groups 
who invested significantly more heavily than predicted by the Markov perfect equi-
librium; furthermore, this only happened rarely because most of the observations 
from the dynamic treatment (where the initial public good stock is endogenous) 
have a  beginning-of-period stock of 25 or less.30
V. Static versus Dynamic: What Have We Learned?
While this is the first experimental study of the dynamic accumulation process 
of a durable public good, a vast experimental literature has addressed the provision 
of public goods in static environments. This begs the following questions: How do 
the results from our dynamic public good experiments compare to the results from 
the repeated static public good games? What new insights can we learn breaking out 
from the static framework?
Comparing directly our dynamic game with the static framework used by the 
previous experimental literature is generally a difficult task, for a number of reasons. 
Even when static public good games are repeated a fixed number of times, the stra-
tegic environment is the same in every period, and there is a unique equilibrium pre-
diction, that does not change over time. The most common example is the voluntary 
contribution game with linear payoffs, in which the individually optimal investment 
level is zero, while the socially optimal one is the whole budget. The equilibrium is 
in dominant strategies, and there are a finite number of periods, so contributions in 
past and future periods do not matter for equilibrium behavior, and agents’ expec-
tations about other agents’ current or future contributions are irrelevant from the 
standpoint of subgame perfect equilibrium.31 The game we study, on the other hand, 
is not only an infinite horizon game, but a stochastic game with an evolving state 
variable, and a strategic environment that changes in every period (as the durable 
public good is accumulated over time). Our theory makes predictions that are path 
dependent and change over time (equilibrium investments are sometimes positive, 
sometimes negative, and sometimes zero, depending on the current stock of public 
good), and, while we restrict attention to the unique concave MPE, the infinite hori-
zon of the game gives rise to a plethora of  nonstationary equilibria that have much 
different properties. In this dynamic setting, not contributing is socially optimal in 
some continuation games (when the stock of the public good has reached the opti-
mal level). More importantly, at any point in time, even in a Markov equilibrium, 
30 Since the  beginning-of-period stock in the dynamic treatment is endogenous we have a reduced number of 
observations for these high values: we use only 18 groups to compute the median investment for a starting stock 
of 35. The remaining 92 groups never accumulated these levels of public good. The  beginning-of-period stock is 
smaller than 25 in 66 percent of observations (regardless of period number). The average  beginning-of-period pub-
lic good stock in periods  8–10 (that is, the long run level of public good) is 15.9. 
31 This applies as well to some of the dynamic games based on the linear voluntary contributions model, includ-
ing the variation with no completion benefit in Duffy, Ochs, and Vesterlund (2007). 
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the individually optimal decision depends on past contributions through their effect 
on the current state, as well as on the expectations on current and future contribu-
tions of other agents. Moreover, a fundamental question of our paper, the impact of 
investment reversibility on the dynamic free rider problem, cannot be studied in a 
static framework where the public good starts out at zero in every period (and, thus, 
contributions can only be  nonnegative).
In spite of these clear difficulties in comparing the two frameworks, we can still 
draw some connections between the behavior observed in repeated static public 
good games and behavior in our dynamic durable public good experiments. In the 
reminder of this section we discuss a few of the most significant similarities and 
differences.
 Overinvestment, Efficiency, and irreversibility.—The first has to do with the gen-
eral issue of whether contributions tend to be above, below, or approximately equal 
to the theoretically predicted levels. In static environments, with few exceptions, 
actual contributions are generally above the equilibrium levels suggesting that equi-
librium theory tends to overpredict the amount of free riding.32 Still, contributions 
not only fail to reach efficient levels (as Ledyard 1995 reports in his survey), but 
are generally very much below. Average contributions in initial plays of the game 
typically fall in a range between 40 percent and 60 percent of the optimal level, 
with a systematic decline to very low levels with repetition (between 10 percent and 
20 percent of the optimal level after 10 periods of play). Similarly, in our dynamic 
environment, there is significant  over-contribution with respect to the predictions of 
the unique MPE in the early periods of play, while the public good stock is beginning 
to accumulate, but this  over-contribution mostly disappears in later periods (espe-
cially with reversible investment, where investments become negative and the long 
run stock of the public good converges to very close to the MPE steady state). These 
declines over time in both the reversible and irreversible cases lead to significantly 
inefficient  long-run public good levels (see Figure 2, and Findings 1 and 2). How 
32 There are a few exceptions. Laury and Holt (2008) investigate  nonlinear, static public good technologies with 
interior equilibrium contributions. Palfrey and Rosenthal (1991) explore threshold public goods with binary contri-
bution decisions. For some of the treatments in these two papers, contributions are less than equilibrium predictions. 
Table 6—Average Investment as a Function of Beginning-of-Period Stocks
RIE 3 RIE 5
 g 0 Dynamic One-shot  p -value Dynamic One-shot  p -value
 0 9.54 (342) 6.47 (120) 0.016 9.48 (300) 7.22 (150) 0.083
 5 2.98 (63) 4.07 (120) 0.935 2.31 (55) 4.88 (150) 0.302
 10 0.70 (93) 2.08 (120) 0.890 0.51 (55) 3.73 (150) 0.104
 15 0.45 (96) 0.65 (120) 0.200 1.90 (80) 2.75 (150) 0.777
 20 −1.56 (90) −2.09 (120) 0.217 −1.67 (45) 0.25 (150) 0.533
 25 −0.91 (78) −3.73 (120) 0.026 0.14 (65) −0.13 (150) 0.067
 30 0.53 (93) −5.53 (120) 0.000 1.20 (40) −1.43 (150) 0.034
 35 4.21 (63) −7.51 (120) 0.000 −0.70 (50) −2.29 (150) 0.055
Notes: The number of observations is in parentheses.  p -values refer to Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests on the equal-
ity of distributions with standard errors clustered by individual.
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serious is the inefficiency with a durable public good, as compared to  one-shot pub-
lic goods problems? Interestingly, the answer depends critically on whether contri-
butions are reversible. With reversibility, the median public good stock converges to 
approximately 2 percent of the efficient steady state. In contrast, with irreversibility, 
the median period 10 stock of public good is approximately 50 percent of the effi-
cient level. Thus, with reversible investments we see efficiency levels that are worse 
than is typically observed in static voluntary contribution games, but the opposite is 
the case with irreversible investment. This very strong effect of irreversibility, with 
important consequences in real world applications of the theory, is not observable in 
static laboratory environments or in repeated games without a state variable.
investment Pattern and Dynamics.—Second, there are some similarities in 
terms of the investment pattern we observe over time: as in the static literature, 
in our dynamic experiments, there is a tendency for initial  overinvestment in the 
early periods, followed by investment levels approaching the theoretical predictions 
(see Figures 4 and 5). Moreover, a similar pattern is observed when subjects are 
 re-matched into new groups and the public good stock starts out at zero, a phe-
nomenon similar to the “ re-start effect” from the static literature (see Andreoni and 
Croson 2008 for a survey).
Contrary to much of the static literature—where the predictions are no contribu-
tions in every period—the time paths we observe in the dynamic games qualitatively 
follow the same pattern as the predicted time paths, especially in later periods. With 
reversible investment, the theory predicts positive investment only in the first period 
and zero investment from the second period on. With irreversible investment, the 
theory predicts positive investment in each period, but at a monotonically decreas-
ing pace. These general patterns are found in our data. Also, the convergence to the 
equilibrium predictions follows a different pattern from static experiments and the 
equilibrium predictions themselves are path dependent and endogenous: in the treat-
ment with reversibility, we observe significant levels of negative investment, with 
subjects reacting to  above-equilibrium accumulation levels and the stock of public 
good gradually declining in the direction of the equilibrium steady state.
Heterogeneity in Behavior.—Finally, another finding of the experimental litera-
ture on static public good games is the existence of distinct types of behavior. This 
was first considered by Isaac, Walker, and Thomas (1984), who  classify each invest-
ment decision as being “Strong  Free-Riding,” “Weak  Free-Riding,” or “Lindahl/
Altruistic” depending on whether the investment is less than 33 percent, between 
33 percent and 66 percent, and more than 66 percent of the individual budget, 
respectively.33 According to this classification, they report 44 percent of invest-
ment decisions in their experiment are Strong  Free-Riding, 27 percent are Weak 
 Free-Riding, and 29 percent are Lindahl/Altruistic. We applied a similar analysis to 
our data (adjusting for the fact that the individual budget in the reversible investment 
treatments is  state-dependent) and we found a rather similar distribution of decision 
33 They do not classify individuals into behavioral types based on their behavior in the ten periods of play. 
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types (pooling all treatments together): 42 percent of investment decisions in our 
experiments are Strong  Free-Riding, 18 percent are decisions are Weak  Free-Riding, 
and 41 percent are Lindahl/Altruistic.
A different approach traces these aggregate patterns of contribution behavior to 
heterogeneity at the individual level. For example, there is some evidence from static 
public good experiments that some individuals behave as “conditional cooperators,” 
whose contribution to the public good is positively correlated with their beliefs 
about the contributions made by their group members (Keser and Van Winden 2000; 
Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr 2001; Burlando and Guala 2005; Fischbacher and 
Gächter 2010).34 While subjects in our experiment are not explicitly asked to make 
decisions contingent on the other group members’ contributions, over the course of 
the experiment they experience a wide range of (endogenous) past group decisions 
and we can use this data to measure the extent to which individual contributions 
respond positively to other group members’ past contributions. There is also evi-
dence for the existence of other behavioral types who are either altruistic or com-
pletely selfish.
To identify these different behavioral types, we follow Fischbacher and Gächter 
(2010) and, for each subject, we estimate a Tobit regression of the deviation from 
predicted investment (notice that, in the static experiment, this is simply equal to the 
investment level) on the average investment of the other group members in the pre-
vious period (with a constant). We then classify each subject as a conditional coop-
erator if the slope is positive and significantly different than zero at the 1 percent 
level; as an “unconditional cooperator” if the slope is not significantly different than 
zero and his average investment deviation is in the top third of the distribution; as 
“free rider” if the slope is not significantly different than zero and his average invest-
ment deviation is in the bottom third of the distribution. The results are reported in 
Table 7. Overall, we measure 53 percent conditional cooperators, 14 percent uncon-
ditional cooperators, 15 percent free riders, and 18 percent unclassified. This dis-
tribution of behavioral types is roughly in line with the static literature, although 
there is considerable variation.35 The fact that we measure a large  percentage of 
 conditional cooperators offers some additional evidence for  non-Markovian strat-
egies. A second result from Table 7 is the difference between reversible and irre-
versible investment treatments: conditional cooperators account for 79 percent of 
subjects in IIE but only for 27 percent of subjects in RIE. This is an interesting 
feature of the data which might contribute to the large difference in observed public 
good accumulation between the two treatments and which we do not have a good 
explanation for.
34 There are different possible interpretations for these behavioral types, such as imitation, conformity, reciproc-
ity, repeated game strategies, etc. 
35 The fraction of conditional cooperators in those other studies is usually around  50–60 percent, but ranges 
from 35 percent (Burlando and Guala 2005) to 80 percent (Keser and Van Winden 2000).
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VI. Conclusions
This paper investigated the dynamic accumulation process of a durable public 
good in a voluntary contribution setup. Despite the fact that most, if not all, public 
goods are durable and have an important dynamic component, very little is known 
on this subject, both from a theoretical and empirical point of view. We attempt to 
provide some initial empirical findings about voluntary contribution behavior with 
durable public goods.
We have considered two possible cases: economies with reversible investments 
(RIE), in which in every period individual investments can either be positive or neg-
ative; and economies with irreversible investments (IIE), in which the public good 
cannot be reduced. Reversibility is an important feature of many public goods prob-
lems (for example, common pool problems), which is completely missed by static 
analysis. We also have a secondary treatment dimension: we compare  three-member 
and  five-member groups. For all treatments, applying results from Battaglini, 
Nunnari, and Palfrey (2014) to our laboratory environment, we have characterized 
the steady states and the accumulation paths that can be supported by the optimal 
solution and by the unique symmetric concave Markov equilibrium.
We highlight three main results. First, the dynamic free riding problem exists and 
it is severe, with the long run public good stock levels falling far short of efficiency 
in all treatments. The additional free riding component that emerges in this dynamic 
game is most obviously seen in reversible investment economies. With reversibility, 
the dynamic dimension exacerbates the free rider problem present in static public 
good provision: if an agent contributes above the equilibrium levels, not only does 
this reduce the future contributions by all agents, but it triggers an extreme form of 
dynamic crowding out: negative investment by other agents that transform part of 
the public good stock in private consumption. In these RIE treatments, the median 
public good stock converges to approximately 2 percent of the efficient steady states, 
versus long-run contributions between 10 percent and 20 percent of the optimal 
level in  finitely repeated static public good games.
On the other hand, in line with the comparative static predictions, irreversible 
investment leads to significantly higher public good production than reversible 
investment. The irreversibility constraint dampens the dynamic free rider problem, 
by creating a commitment device and reducing the  crowding-out effect of contri-
butions. Notice that this has nothing to do with history dependent trigger strategies 
made possible by the infinite horizon: a similar dynamic would arise in a model 
with a finite horizon (but losing stationarity of equilibrium strategies). In the IIE 
Table 7—Classification of Subjects’ Strategies
IIE3 IIE5 RIE3 RIE5 Overall
Unconditional cooperator 0.03 (1) 0.13 (4) 0.15 (5) 0.27 (8) 0.14 (18)
Conditional cooperator 0.81 (29) 0.77 (23) 0.24 (8) 0.30 (9) 0.54 (69)
Free rider 0.11 (4) 0.07 (2) 0.27 (9) 0.13 (4) 0.15 (19)
Other 0.06 (2) 0.03 (1) 0.33 (11) 0.30 (9) 0.18 (23)
Note: The number of subjects is in parentheses.
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environment where the public good cannot be converted back to consumption, the 
median period 10 stock of the public good is approximately 50 percent of the effi-
cient level.
Second, we have shown that, in both the RIE and IIE environments, there is 
 overinvestment in the early periods, compared to the equilibrium investment levels. 
In RIE, this is followed by a significant reversal, with the stock of public good grad-
ually declining in the direction of the equilibrium steady state. In IIE, where disin-
vestment is not feasible, investment steadily decreases but the initial  overinvestment 
cannot be reversed and the long-run level of the public good remains significantly 
above the equilibrium steady state.
Third, we have proposed a novel experimental methodology to test the assump-
tion that subjects’ strategies in this complex  infinite-horizon game depend only on 
the state variable, that is, the accumulated level of the public good.
This is the first experimental study of the dynamic accumulation process of a 
durable public good. Our design was intentionally very simple and used a limited 
set of treatments. As a consequence, there are many possible directions for the next 
steps in this research. The theory has interesting comparative static predictions about 
the effect of other parameters that we have not explored in this work, such as the 
discount factor, the depreciation level, preferences, and endowments. For example, 
a higher discount factor increases both the optimal steady state and the equilibrium 
steady state of the durable public good for all values of  n and for both reversible 
and irreversible economies. For similar reasons, positive depreciation in the public 
good technology leads to a decrease in the steady state of the Markov equilibrium 
studied here. Among these extensions, it would be particularly interesting to run 
experiments that allow a closer comparison with the results from the static liter-
ature. This can be done in a number of different ways: for example, experiments 
with a finite and known horizon of one period (that is,  δ = 0 ), or experiments 
with full depreciation of the stock at the end of each period and an infinite horizon 
(that is,  δ > 0 ).
Moreover, our model and experimental design does not consider different rules 
for negative investment (for example, allowing subjects to disinvest unilaterally up 
to the whole stock and adopting a rationing rule to keep a nonnegative level of pub-
lic good), or the effect of a completion benefit at a specified accumulation threshold. 
We have also limited the analysis to voluntary contribution mechanisms that turn 
out to be highly inefficient, both in theory and in practice. Battaglini, Nunnari, and 
Palfrey (2012) study how centralized mechanisms fare in providing durable public 
goods and show that efficiency increases with the majority rule required to approve 
an allocation decision. An interesting direction to pursue from here would be to 
 consider different decentralized mechanisms and explore which ones are more effi-
cient for the provision of durable public goods.
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Appendix A: Proofs of Propositions
A. Proof of Proposition 1
The fact that a strictly concave equilibrium has the property stated in the prop-
osition follows from the discussion in the text. Here we prove existence and 
uniqueness.
Existence.—First note that when we use the functional form  u(g) = α  √ __ g , we 
have  u′ (g) =  α __ 2  √ __ g and  [u′ ] −1 (x) =  ( α __ 2x) 2 . Battaglini, Nunnari, and Palfrey (2014) 
show that there is a weakly concave Markov equilibrium with steady state equal 
to  y r ∗ for any  y r ∗ ∈  [ ( αn _____ 2(n − δ)) 2 ,  ( α _____ 2(1 − δ)) 2 ] . To prove that the equilibrium cor-
responding to the steady state  y r ∗ =  ( αn _____ 2(n − δ)) 2 is strictly concave, we provide an 
alternative (self contained) existence proof.
Let  y r ∗ =  ( αn _____ 2(n − δ)) 2 and  g r 1 = max {0,  y r ∗ − W} . For any  g >  g r 1 define a 
value function  v r 1 (g) =  W − ( y r 
∗ − g) ________n +  1 ___ 1 − δ α  √ 
__ y r∗ + δ  W __n . Note that this function 
is continuous, nondecreasing, weakly concave, and differentiable with respect 
to  g , with derivative  [ v r 1]  ′ (g) =  1 _n. From strict concavity of  u(g) it follows 
that, for any  g >  g r 1, the objective function in (2) is strictly concave. Let 
 g r 2 = max {0,  g r 1 − W} , and define
  v r 2 (g) =  { 
 v r 1 (g) g ≥  g r 
1
    α  √ ____ g + W + δ  v r 1(g + W)  g ∈  [ g r 2 ,  g r 1)  .
Note that  v r 2 (g) is continuous and differentiable in  g ≥  g r 2, except at most at  g r 1. 
To see that the objective function in (2) is strictly concave in this interval, note 
that it is strictly concave for  g ≥  g r 1. Moreover, for any  g ∈  [ g r 2 ,  g r 1) and  g′ ≥  g r 1
we have
     [ v r 2]  ′ (g) =  α ________ 2  √  g + W + δ  [ v r 
1]  ′ (g + W )
 >  α _____ 
2  √  y r∗ + δ  [ v r 
1]  ′ (  y r ∗) = 1 >  1 __n =  [ v r 1]  ′ (g) .
The first inequality derives from  y r ∗ > g + W  (which is true, by definition of  g r 1
and  g r 2, for all g ∈  [ g r 2 ,  g r 1) ) , strict concavity of  u(g) and weak concavity of  v r 1 (g) . 
It follows that  u(g) + δ  v r 2 (g) is strictly concave in  g ≥  g r 2. Assume that for all 
 g ≥  g r n, with  g r n ≥ 0 and either  g r n <  g r 2 or  g r n = 0 , we have defined a value 
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function  v r n (g) that is concave and continuous, and that is differentiable in  g >  g r 1. 
Define  g r n+1 = max {0,  g r n − W} , and
  v r n+1 (g) =  { 
 v r n (g) g ≥  g r 
n
    α  √ ____ g + W + δ  v r n (g + W)
 
g ∈  [ g r n+1 ,  g r n)  .
Using the same steps as above, we can easily show that this function is weakly 
concave, continuous in  g ≥  g r n+1 , and differentiable for  g >  g r 1. Moreover, either 
g r n+1 = 0 or  g r n+1 <  g r n. We can therefore define inductively a value function 
 v r (g) for any  g ≥ 0 that is continuous, weakly concave, and that is differentiable 
at least for  g >  g r 1, and so, in particular, at  y r ∗. This value function will give rise 
to an objective function in (2), which is strictly concave. Define now the following 
strategies:
(A1)  y r (g) = min {W + g,  y r ∗} , and  x A (g) =  [W + g −  y r (g)] /n. 
We will argue that  v r (g),  y r (g),  x A (g) is an equilibrium. To see this, note that by con-
struction, if the agent uses strategies  y r (g),  x A (g) , then  v r (g) describes the expected 
continuation value function of an agent. To see that  y r (g),  x A (g) are optimal given 
v r (g), note that for  g ≥  g r 1,  { y r ∗ ,  W + g −  y r ∗_______ n } maximizes (2) when all the constraints 
except the second are considered; and for  g ≥  g r 1,  W + g >  y r ∗, so the second con-
straint is satisfied as well. For  g <  g r 1, we must have  y r (g) = W + g ,  x A (g) = 0 . 
We conclude that  y r (g) ,  x A (g) is an optimal reaction function given  v r (g) . 
uniqueness.—Consider a strictly concave equilibrium with value function  v r (g) . 
Because  u(g) + δ  v r (g) − g is strictly concave, there is a unique maximum  y r ∗ of the 
objective function of (2). It follows that we must have  y r (g) = min {W + g,  y r ∗} , 
implying that  y r (g) =  y r ∗ for any  g ≥  y r ∗ − W and  y r ( y r ∗) =  y r ∗. It is straightfor-
ward to show that the derivative of the value function in  g ≥  y r ∗ − W exists and it 
is equal to  v r ′ (g) = 1/n . Using the first-order condition that defines  y r ∗, we must 
have  α ____ 
2  √ ___ y r∗ + δ  v r ′ ( y r 
∗) = 1 . This implies that in any strictly concave Markov equi-
librium we must have a steady state  y r ∗ =  ( αn _____ 2(n − δ)) 2 . 
B. Proof of Proposition 2
Since the equilibrium is weakly concave, we must have that  v ir (g) admits a right 
and left derivative at any point  g . Let us call  y ir + ( y ir ∗ ) and  y ir − ( y ir ∗ ) the, respectively, 
right and left derivatives. Since at  y r ∗ we must have  y ir ( y ir ∗ ) =  y ir ∗ , it is easy to see 
that  y ir + ( y ir ∗ ) = 1 , since  y ir ( y ir ∗ + Δ) =  y ir ∗ + Δ .
Consider now the left derivative. In a left neighborhood of  y ir ∗ , we must have 
y ir (g) ∈  (0, W + g) , so  x ir (g) > 0 and
(A2)  y ir (g) ∈  arg max 
y
  {α  √ __ y + δ  v ir (y) − y}  .
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We can write
   v ir (g) =  W + g −  y ir (g)  ___________n + α  √ 
_____ y ir (g) + δ  v ir (g) ( y ir (g)) 
 = α  √ _____ y ir (g) + δ  v ir (g) ( y ir (g)) −  y ir (g) +  W + g − (n − 1)  y ir (g)   _______________ n .
By the theorem of the maximum, we therefore have  v ir ′ (g) =  1 _n +  n − 1 ___n  y ir ′ (g) . 
Combining this expression with the first-order condition of (A2), we obtain
  y ir ′ (g) =  
1 − n (1 −  α ____ 2  √ __ g) /δ  _______________ 
1 − n 
for any  g <  y ir ∗ . At  y ir ∗ , the left derivative must therefore be  y ir − ( y ir ∗ ) 
=  
1 − n (1 −  α _____ 2  √ ___ y ir∗ ) /δ  _____________1 − n . Imposing  y ir − ( y ir ∗ ) =  y ir + ( y ir ∗ ) = 1 , we obtain that in any 
concave Markov equilibrium with irreversibility we must have  y ir ∗ =  ( α _____ 2(1 − δ)) 2 
as claimed.
C. Proof of Proposition 3
The efficient outcome (the social planner solution characterized in Section IA) 
can be sustained in the voluntary contribution game with reversible investment, when 
agents use  nonstationary strategies entailing reversal to the unique concave Markov 
equilibrium characterized in Section IB. To show this, we construct strategies whose 
outcome is the efficient level of public good and we show that there is no profitable 
deviation from the equilibrium path. The symmetric strategy for each group member 
is to invest  i P ∗ (g) = min { W __n ,   y P 
∗ − g _____n } if  g t =  y ∗ ( g t−1 ) (i.e., if the observed level of 
the public good at the beginning of the period is consistent with equilibrium strat-
egies, or, in other words, it is the efficient level of public good given the stock of 
g at the beginning of the previous period) and to invest  i r ∗ (g) = min { W __n ,   y r 
∗ − g _____n } , 
where  y r ∗ <  y P ∗ (i.e., the investment associated with the Markov equilibrium charac-
terized in Proposition 1) if  g t ≠  y ∗ ( g t−1 ) (i.e., if a deviation from equilibrium has 
occurred in the previous period). To prove that this strategy profile is an equilibrium 
we show that agents have no profitable deviation.
An agent’s payoff if she follows the equilibrium strategy is
  W ___n −  i P ∗ (g) + α  √ 
_______ g + n  i P ∗ (g) + δ  V EQ (g + n  i P ∗ (g)) .
An agent’s payoff if she deviates (according to her most profitable deviation) is
  W ___n +  g __n + α  √ ________________  g −  g _n + (n − 1)  i P ∗ (g) + δ  V DEV (g −  g _n + (n − 1)  i P ∗ (g)) .
An agent’s most profitable deviation is to invest  − g/n (i.e., to subtract from the 
public good her share and to consume it). The gains from this deviation are greater 
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the closer  g is to  y P ∗ . Therefore, we will check whether an agent has an incentive to 
deviate when  g ∈ [ g P ,  y P ∗] , or whether
  W __n −   y P 
∗ − g
 _____n + α  √ 
__
 y P∗ + δ  V EQ ( y P ∗) ≥  W __n +  g _n + α  √ _________________   g −  g _n + (n − 1)   y P ∗ − g______n 
 + δ  V DEV  (g −  g _n + (n − 1)   y P 
∗ − g
 ______n ) ,
where  V EQ (  y P ∗) =  1 ___ 1 − δ[ W __n + α  √ 
___ y P∗] , and
  V DEV ( n − 1 ____n  y P ∗) =  W __n −   y r 
∗ −  n − 1 _____n  y P ∗  __________n + α  √ 
___ y r∗ + δ  V DEV (  y r ∗) 
 =  W __n −   y r 
∗ −  n − 1 _____n  y P ∗  __________n + α  √ 
___ y r∗ +  δ ____ 1 − δ  ( W ___n + α  √ 
___ y r∗) .
After we plug in  V EQ (  y P ∗) and  V DEV  ( n − 1 ___n  y P ∗) and we  re-arrange terms, the 
inequality above becomes
  1 ____ 
1 − δ  [α  √ 
___ y P∗ − δα  √ ___ y r∗] −  δ __n  [ (n − 1) _____n  y P ∗ −  y r ∗] ≥ α  √ ______ n − 1 ____n  y P∗ +   y P ∗ ___n .
Replacing  y P ∗ =  ( αn _____ 2(1 − δ)) 2 and  y r ∗ =  ( αn _____ 2(n − δ)) 2 , the inequality we want to 
prove becomes
   1 ____ 
1 − δ  [  α 2 n ______ 2(1 − δ) −  δ  α 
2 n ______ 
2(n − δ)] −  δ(n − 1)  α 
2 ________
4  (1 − δ) 2   + δn  ( α ______ 2(n − δ)) 
2 
    ≥   α 2 n ______ 
2(1 − δ)  √ 
____
 n − 1____n +   α 
2 n _______ 
4  (1 − δ) 2 .
Multiplying both sides by  (1 − δ) 2 and rearranging, we have
    α 2 n ____
2
 −   α 2 n ____
4
 −  δ  α 2 (n − 1)  ________
4
 
    ≥ (1 − δ)  α 2 n  ____
2
  √ ____ n − 1____n − δn  ( α(1 − δ) ______2(n − δ)) 
2
 +  (1 − δ) δ  α 2 n  _________
2(n − δ) .
There is  δ ˆr , such that  ∀ δ >  δ ˆr the inequality above holds. To see this note that 
as  δ approaches one the RHS approaches zero, while the LHS is positive for any 
δ ∈ [0, 1] .
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Using the parameters and the utility function of our experiments,  δ ˆr = 0.80 
for  n = 3 and  δ ˆr = 0.86 for  n = 5. We use  δ = 0.75 , which means that, in the 
experimental setting, the efficient level of the public good cannot be sustained in 
equilibrium. However, it can be shown that  nonstationary strategies of the type pro-
posed above can sustain an almost efficient level of the public good,  y ∗ . In this case, 
the inequality we want to prove is
  1 _______ 
1 − 0.75  [4  √ 
__ y ∗ − 3  √ ___ y r∗] −  0.75 _____n  [ (n − 1) _____n  y ∗ −  y r ∗] ≥ 4  √ ______ n − 1 ____n  y ∗ +   y ∗  __n .
This inequality holds for  y ∗ = 520 in the treatment with 3 agents (where 
y P ∗ = 576 ) and for  y ∗ = 1,332 in the treatment with 5 agents (where  y P ∗ = 1,600 ).
Appendix B: Additional Tables
Table B1—Summary Statistics of Public Good Stock per Period, RIE
RIE 3 RIE 5
Period Theory Observations Average Mdn Theory Observations Average Mdn
 1  7.11  110  29.24  29  5.54  60  47.38  50.5 
 2  7.11  70  42.33  39.5  5.54  48  70.21  67 
 3  7.11  51  33.02  20  5.54  33  59.97  34 
 4  7.11  40  31.70  17.5  5.54  24  51.08  22.5 
 5  7.11  33  29.85  11  5.54  21  42.29  27 
 6  7.11  22  33.86  17.5  5.54  15  50.60  32 
 7  7.11  11  15.55  12  5.54  12  36.58  36.5 
 8  7.11  11  13.64  11  5.54  12  44.50  42.5 
 9  7.11  11  15.82  16  5.54  6  32.00  35.5 
 10  7.11  3  16.00  10  5.54  6  28.83  22 
 11  7.11  3  21.67  29  5.54  3  24.00  24 
 12  7.11  3  26.67  31  5.54  3  30.67  43 
 13  7.11  3  30.33  31  5.54  3  31.67  37 
Note: Observations are groups.
Table B2—Summary Statistics of Public Good Stock per Period, IIE
IIE 3 IIE 5
Period Theory Observations Average Mdn Theory Observations Average Mdn
 1  21.32  120  39.21  45  18.88  60  56.12  57 
 2  27.04  92  83.35  92  24.56  57  109.86  114 
 3  30.96  72  128.44  140.5  28.52  54  158.74  168.5 
 4  33.92  68  162.90  177.5  31.64  42  200.36  218 
 5  36.28  64  193.09  202.5  34.12  33  239.15  244 
 6  38.24  56  233.86  238  36.24  30  270.67  270 
 7  39.88  44  261.30  265.5  38.04  21  301.71  292 
 8  41.32  36  291.72  287.5  39.64  18  323.93  324 
 9  42.56  28  308.50  314.5  41.04  15  345.27  346 
 10  43.64  20  298.40  293.5  42.28  12  386.08  367 
 11  44.60  20  315.40  318  43.40  6  366.33  308.5 
 12  45.48  16  303.75  291  44.44 — — —
 13  46.28  8  382.25  385  45.40 — — —
 14  47.00  8  400.38  391.5  46.28 — — —
 15  47.64  4  435.00  424.5  47.08 — — —
 16  48.24  4  465.00  459.5  47.84 — — —
 17  48.80  4  495.75  496  48.52 — — —
Note: Observations are groups.
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Table B3—Summary Statistics of Individual Investment per Period, RIE
RIE 3 RIE 5
Period Observations Average Mdn SD Observations Average Mdn SD
 1  330  9.75  10  6.27  300  9.48  11  6.76 
 2  210  4.45  5  8.97  240  3.79  4  10.49 
 3  153  − 2.85  − 3  10.72  165  − 1.78  − 2  11.61 
 4  120  − 1.13  0  9.62  120  − 1.74  0  12.28 
 5  99  − 0.61  0  7.86  105  − 2.8  − 2  11.29 
 6  66  2.02  1  6.08  75  0.76  0  11.64 
 7  33  0.55  0  4.85  60  − 2.37  − 1.5  12.87 
 8  33  − 0.64  0  4.33  60  1.58  0  9.45 
 9  33  0.73  0  5.85  30  − 1.93  − 2  9.09 
 10  9  − 3.22  − 5  6.34  30  − 0.63  − 2  8.03 
 11  9  1.89  4  6.15  15  3.33  2  5.37 
 12  9  1.67  3  9.92  15  1.33  − 1  6.38 
 13  9  1.22  0  9.09  15  0.20  0  6.68 
Note: Observations are individual investment decisions.
Table B4—Summary Statistics of Individual Investment per Period, IIE
IIE 3 IIE 5
Period Observations Average Mdn SD Observations Average Mdn SD
 1  360  13.07  15  6.87  300  11.22  14  5.36 
 2  276  13.54  15  6.65  285  10.68  12  5.63 
 3  216  13.36  15  6.44  270  9.88  11  5.97 
 4  204  12.00  15  6.88  210  8.83  8.5  6.23 
 5  192  10.17  10  7.46  165  7.73  8  6.28 
 6  168  9.51  10  7.63  150  6.70  5  6.29 
 7  132  8.28  5  7.80  105  6.43  4  6.51 
 8  108  6.39  5  6.90  90  5.91  3  6.32 
 9  84  5.77  4.5  6.85  75  5.27  2  6.33 
 10  60  5.87  4.5  6.67  60  4.00  0  6.11 
 11  60  5.67  1.5  7.27  30  2.73  0  5.07 
 12  48  4.15  1  6.15 — — — —
 13  24  6.21  4.5  7.42 — — — —
 14  24  6.04  3  7.62 — — — —
 15  12  10.83  10  8.75 — — — —
 16  12  10.00  8  7.89 — — — —
 17  12  10.25  9  7.69 — — — —
Note: Observations are individual investment decisions.
Table B5—p-Values of  t -Tests on the Equality of Public Good Stock Averages
Period RIE3/IIE3 RIE5/IIE5 RIE3/RIE5 IIE3/IIE5
 1  0.000  0.005  0.000  0.000 
 2  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 3  0.000  0.000  0.023  0.000 
 4  0.000  0.000  0.150  0.002 
 5  0.000  0.000  0.402  0.013 
 6  0.000  0.000  0.381  0.120 
 7  0.000  0.000  0.043  0.223 
 8  0.000  0.000  0.006  0.418 
 9  0.000  0.000  0.070  0.478 
 10  0.000  0.000  0.326  0.154 
304 AMEricAN EcONOMic JOurNAL: MicrOEcONOMics NOVEMBEr 2016
Appendix C: Sample Experimental Instructions (RIE5)
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this experiment. During the experiment 
we require your complete, undistracted attention and ask that you follow instruc-
tions carefully. Please turn off your cell phones. Do not open other applications on 
your computer, chat with other students, or engage in other distracting activities, 
such as reading books, doing homework, etc. You will be paid for your participa-
tion in cash, at the end of the experiment. Different participants may earn different 
amounts. What you earn depends partly on your decisions, partly on the decisions 
of others, and partly on chance. It is important that you not talk or in any way try to 
communicate with other participants during the experiments.
Following the instructions, there will be a practice session and a short comprehen-
sion quiz. All questions on the quiz must be answered correctly before continuing to 
the paid session. At the end you will be paid in private and you are under no obliga-
tion to tell others how much you earned. Your earnings are denominated in FRANCS 
which will be converted to dollars at the rate of 75 FRANCS to a DOLLAR.
This is an experiment in group decision making. The experiment will take place 
over a sequence of ten matches. We begin the match by dividing you into THREE 
groups of five members each. Each of you is assigned to exactly one of these groups. 
In each match each member of your group will make investment decisions.
In each round, each member of your group has a budget of 16 francs. Each mem-
ber must individually decide how to divide his or her budget into private investment 
and project investment, in integer amounts. The private investment always has to 
be greater than or equal than zero. The project investment can be either positive, or 
zero, or negative. Any amount you allocate to private investment goes directly to 
your earnings for this round. The project investment produces earnings for all group 
members in the following way.
[SHOW SLIDE]
The project earnings in a round depend on the size of the project at the end of that 
round. Specifically, each group member earns an amount in francs proportional to 
Table B6—p-Values of Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Tests on Stocks, Early versus 
Late Matches
Period RIE3 RIE5 IIE3 IIE5
 1  0.138  0.611  0.096  0.004 
 2  0.168  0.161  0.000  0.010 
 3  0.009  0.591  0.000  0.008 
 4  0.072  0.057  0.000  0.277 
 5  0.916  0.904  0.000  0.590 
 6  0.116  1.000  0.000  0.645 
 7  0.658  0.400  0.002  0.593 
 8  0.215  0.941  0.011  0.592 
 9  0.086  —  0.002  0.574 
 10  —  —  0.198  0.920 
Notes: Early matches are one through five. Late matches are six through ten. We lack observa-
tions in both groups for period ten in RIE3 and for periods nine and ten in RIE5.
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the square root of the size of the project at the end of the round (precisely equal to 
4 × sqrt(project size)). Thus, for example, if the size of the project at the end of the 
round equals 9, then each member earns exactly 4 × sqrt(9) = 12 additional francs 
in that round. If the size is equal to 36, each member earns exactly 4 × sqrt(36) = 24 
additional francs in that round. In your display, earnings are always rounded to two 
decimal places. So, for example if the project size at the end of a round equals 5, 
each member earns 4 × sqrt(5) = 8.94 francs from the project in that round.
The second important fact about the project is that it is durable. That is, project 
investment in a round increases or decreases the size not just for that round, but 
also for all future rounds. The size of your group’s project starts at zero in the first 
round of the match. At the end of the first round it is equal to the sum of your group 
members’ project investment in that round. This amount gets carried over to the 
second round. Whenever the size of the project is greater than zero, you can propose 
a negative project investment. However, in this case, the proposed negative invest-
ment cannot exceed one-fifth of the size of the project at the beginning of the round 
(in other words, you can dispose only of your share of the project). At the end of 
the second round, the size of the project equals to the combined amount invested in 
the project in rounds 1 and 2 by all members of your group, and so forth. So, every 
round project investment changes the size of the project for the current round and all 
future rounds of the match.
The total number of rounds in a match will depend on the rolling of a fair 
 eight-sided die. When the first round ends, we roll it to decide whether to move on to 
the second round. If the die comes up a one or a two we do not go on to round 2, and 
the match is over. Otherwise, we continue to the next round. We continue to more 
rounds, until a one or a two is rolled at the end of a round and the match ends. At the 
end of each round your earnings for that round are computed by adding the project 
earnings to your private investment. For example, if your private investment is 20 and 
the  end-of-round project size is 9, then your earnings for that round equal 20 + 4 × 
sqrt(9) = 20 + 12 = 32. Your earnings for the match equal the sum of the earn-
ings in all rounds of that match.
After the first match ends, we move to match 2. In this new match, you are reshuf-
fled randomly into THREE new groups of five members each. The project size in 
your new group again starts out at zero. The match then proceeds the same way as 
match 1. After match 10, the experiment is over. Your total earnings for the experi-
ment are the sum of your earnings over all rounds and all matches.
We will now go through one practice match very slowly. During the practice 
match, please do not hit any keys until I tell you, and when you are prompted by the 
computer to enter information, please wait for me to tell you exactly what to enter. 
You are not paid for this practice match.
[AUTHENTICATE CLIENTS]
Please double click on the icon on your desktop that says BP2. When the computer 
prompts you for your name, type your First and Last name. Then click SUBMIT and 
wait for further instructions. You now see the first screen of the experiment on your 
computer. It should look similar to this screen.
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[SHOW SLIDE]
At the top left of the screen, you see your subject ID. In the top right you can 
see that you have been assigned by the computer to a group of FIVE subjects, and 
assigned a group member number: 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5. This group assignment and your 
member number stays the same for all rounds of this match, but will change across 
matches. It is very important that you take careful note of your group member 
number.
As a visual aid, there is a graph on the left that shows exactly how project earn-
ings will depend on project size. The current size of the project is marked with a 
large dot at the origin. If each member of your group decides to invest nothing this 
period, then this will be the size that determines your project earnings at the end of 
the round. You can use your mouse to move the curser along the curve to figure out 
what your earnings will be for different levels of project investment. Also, if you 
type an amount in the Project Investment box, the computer will compute and dis-
play the corresponding project earnings for you just below the box. Take a minute to 
practice using your curser to move along the curve, and typing in different possible 
investment levels. But do not hit the confirm button yet.
At this time, go ahead and type in any investment decision you wish and hit the 
confirm button. You are not paid for this practice match so it does not matter what 
you enter.
[SHOW SLIDE]
This screen now summarizes the outcome of the round. Here you see your group 
member number, and the end of round project size. The investment decisions of 
each member are displayed in a table. Below the table are displayed your earnings 
for the round, given the outcome. This marks the end of the round. The table with 
columns in the bottom of your screen is the History panel and summarizes all of this 
important information.
We now roll an  eight-sided die to decide whether to move on to round 2. If the 
die comes up a one or a two, we do not go on to round 2, and the match is over. If 
the die comes up three through eight, we continue to a second round of the match. 
[Roll die and do second round unless it comes up a one or two. Next say “the die 
roll was X, so we will continue to the next round.” If X = (one or two) say “if this 
was a real match, there would be no second round. That would be the end of the 
match. However, we want to go through one more practice round to make sure you 
are familiar with the computer interface.”]
[SHOW SLIDE]
In this second round, you keep the same group member number as in the first 
round, and the members of your group all stay the same. Notice that the project 
investment from round 1 carries over, so the round 2 beginning project size equals 
the project size at the end of round 1. In this second round please follow the same 
instructions of the first round. You can go ahead now. Since this is a practice match, 
VOL. 8 NO. 4 307BATTAGLINI ET AL.: DYNAMIC FREE RIDING EXPERIMENT
we will not roll a die after the second round, and the practice match will end. During 
the paid matches, each match will continue until the die comes up a one or a two.
[DISPLAY SUMMARY SCREEN]
Now we are ready for the comprehension quiz. Everyone must answer all the 
questions correctly before we go to the paid matches. The quiz has two pages. You 
must answer all the questions on Page 1 of the quiz to proceed to Page 2. If you 
answer any of the questions on a page incorrectly, you will be asked to try again. 
Please raise your hand if you have any questions during the quiz, and we will come 
to your desk and answer your question in private.
[REASSURE THEM IT’S OK TO ASK FOR HELP]
[WAIT FOR END OF QUIZ]
Are there any questions before we begin with the paid session?
[WAIT FOR QUESTIONS]
We will now begin with the first of ten paid matches of the experiment. Please 
pull out your dividers for the paid session of the experiment. If there are any prob-
lems or questions from this point on, raise your hand and an experimenter will come 
and assist you in private.
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